ARTICLE

STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM’S IMPACT

MARK J. ROE†
Stock-market–driven short-termism is crippling the American economy, according
to legal, judicial, and media analyses. Firms forgo the R&D they need, cut capital
spending, and buy back their own stock so feverishly that they starve themselves of cash.
The stock market is the primary cause: directors and executives cannot manage for the
long term when their shareholders furiously trade their company’s stock, they cannot
make long-term investments when stockholders demand to see profits on this quarter’s
financial statements, they cannot even strategize about the long term when shareholder
activists demand immediate results, and they cannot keep the cash to invest in their
future when stock market pressure drains away that cash in stock buybacks.
This doomsday version of the stock-market–driven short-termism argument
entails economy-wide predictions that have not been well-examined for their severity
and accuracy. If the scenario is correct and strong, we should first see sharp increases
in stock trading in recent decades and more frequent activist interventions, and these
increases should be accompanied by (1) sharply declining investment spending in the
United States, where large firms depend on stock markets and where activists are
important, as compared to advanced economies that do not depend as much on stock
markets, (2) buybacks bleeding cash out from the corporate sector, (3) economy-wide
R&D spending declining from what it should be, and (4) a stock market unwilling
to support innovative, long-term, technological firms. These are the central channels
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from stock-market–driven short-termism to overall economic degradation. They
justify corporate law policies that seek to prevent these outcomes.
But these predicted economy-wide outcomes are either undemonstrated, implausible,
or untrue. Corporate R&D is not declining, corporate cash is not bleeding out, and the
world’s developed nations with neither American-style quarterly oriented stock markets
nor aggressive activist investors are investing no more intensely in capital equipment than
the United States. The five largest American firms by stock market capitalization are
tech-oriented, R&D intensive, longer-term operations. The economy-wide picture is more
one of capital markets moving capital from larger, older firms to younger ones; of a postindustrial economy doing more R&D than ever; and of an economy whose investment
intensity depends on overall economic activity, not stock market trading nor hedge fund
activism. True, the economy-wide data could hide stock market hits that hold back R&D
from increasing more and that weaken American capital spending more than is fitting for
a post-industrial economy. But if so, these effects have not been shown and several seem
implausible. Hence, the calamitous form of the stock-market–driven short-termist
argument needs to be reconsidered, recalibrated, and, quite plausibly, rejected.
Then, last, comes the broadest question: why has a view that lacks strong
economy-wide evidentiary support become the rare corporate governance issue that
attracts attention from the media, political players, policymakers, and the public—
and that is widely accepted as true? I suggest why in this paper’s final part.
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INTRODUCTION
A widely held view among Washington policymakers, the corporate
judiciary, corporate executives, the media, and the public is that increasingly
frenzied trading in the stock market, coupled with Wall Street’s insatiable
appetite for immediate profits, starves too many American firms and harms
the economy. Jobs are lost and technological progress is stunted, while
solutions are so easy to implement that one fumes at their absence.
The World Economic Forum—the Davos people—heard the problem put
as sharply as one can imagine: “The finance world’s short-termism will destroy
our communities, economies and the planet.”1
The Economist reports that “several grand theories have emerged about
what went wrong [with the American economy in the past decade]. Economists
fret about secular stagnation, debt hangovers and . . . demography. [But i]n
American boardrooms, meanwhile, a widely held view is that a dangerous
short-termism has taken hold.”2
Leo Strine, one of the nation’s leading corporate law judges and thinkers
on corporate law, published a major statement of this corporate governance
problem last year that sharply criticizes stock market short-termism’s impact
on American corporations, workers, and savers.3
These are hardly isolated attacks. Executives at public companies obsess
over their quarterly earnings reports to stockholders, it’s said. To keep Wall
Street content, executives slash research and development, lay off productive
employees, and refuse to invest in factories, equipment, and technology. Each
reduction cuts a short-term expense but hurts the firm’s future. Executives
want to do better but have no choice, because if they slip this quarter, the
1 Sasja Beslik, The Finance World’s Short-Termism Will Destroy Our Communities, Economies and the
Planet, WORLD ECON. F. (May 17, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/the-finance-world-sshort-termism-will-destroy-our-communities-economies-and-the-planet/ [https://perma.cc/82QB-77T7]
(emphasis added) (detailing the position pushed forward for the World Economic Forum by the Head of
Sustainable Finance, Nordea Group, the largest financial group in northern Europe).
2 Corporate Short-Termism Is a Frustratingly Slippery Idea, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2017, at 58.
3 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871-72 (2017) (noting
that “corporate stockholder bases turn over rapidly”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental
Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8, 11, 26 (2010).
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critics say, stock markets will punish them and their company. Activist vulture
investors will circle, challenge executives’ authority and, if the executives do
not accede, demand their replacement.
Meanwhile, firms with extra cash boost their stock price by buying back
their stock instead of investing in their future. Cash that should have boosted
productivity escapes from the firm.
Worse, executives at not-yet-targeted firms fear that activists and traders
will punish the executives’ firms’ stock price if the executives go long-term.
How can a firm invest for the long term when its owners are transients who
may not own any of its stock tomorrow? The economy suffers.
The view is common in corporate, judicial, and academic circles that
management must be freed further from investor influence so as to reduce
the impact of investors’ pernicious short-term, profits-now orientation. These
ideas are in the political and corporate lawmaking atmosphere and have
captured the imagination of the most important corporate lawmakers in the
United States, namely the judges who make corporate law.
Yet, for a view that is so widely shared, the evidence in its favor is sparse.
Indeed, the overall, economy-wide evidence—the focus in this Article—fails
to support this short-termist view and mostly points to capital markets
functioning well enough and not sharply biased against the long-term.
*
*
*
By examining the channels through which stock market short-termism is
said to harm the economy, we can better judge the severity of any economy-wide
impact. The predicates and consequences of pernicious stock market shorttermism should by now be detectable in economy-wide data, if short-termism is
deep. First, as a predicate, we should see more frenzied trading and more activist
engagements in recent decades. As these two increase, the economy, and large
public firms, should spend less on research and development than is ideal and
the stock market should shun future-oriented firms. Cash should be draining
from the corporate sector as stockholder pressure for more stock buybacks
increases. And we should see capital expenditures decreasing rapidly in nations
that, like the United States, heavily depend on stock markets and less rapidly in
nations less dependent on stock markets.
There’s data supporting the short-term theorists’ predicates: by important
measures trading increased in recent decades and activist engagements have,
by any interpretation of the data, increased sharply.
But are the projected consequences present?
Capital investment has indeed decreased in the past decade, but tying the
result primarily to stock market short-termism is analytically weak and probably
wrong. First, factory-capacity utilization in the United States had not yet, in early
2018, recovered from the 2008–2009 recession. It makes little sense for firms to
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invest in new capital equipment until they use equipment in place well. Second,
if the stock-market–driven story were correct, capital spending trends for the
United States and for nations whose corporate sectors are not subject to powerful
American-style stock market pressures should differ sharply. Yet, there is no
difference: the capital expenditure decline is a developed-nation, worldwide
phenomenon, not an American, stock market-based one.
Stock buybacks rose after the 2008–2009 financial crisis; examined alone,
one might conclude that cash is indeed bleeding out. But long-term
borrowing rose in tandem. Low interest rates pushed corporate America to
substitute low-interest debt for stock. Viewed as a capital structure decision,
the double trend—more low-interest debt, less equity—fits the short-termist
critique poorly. Overall, public firms have more cash, not less.
The economy is not spending less now overall on R&D. Trading may be
frenetic, but R&D is not declining. It’s hard to see the stock market as
resistant to technology, R&D, and a long-term view when America’s largest
firms are tech-oriented and the newest public firms reach the stock market
with weak, and often no, profits, just projections of a profitable future.
Thus the proffered channels from stock market short-termism to economywide degradation seem unlikely (capital investment), false (cash drainage,
stock market rejection of longer-term technology), or not demonstrated
(R&D). I do not aim to show that public firms are all free of stock-market–
driven short-termism. I do not think they are. Rather, the aim is to assess
whether the evidence of overall, economy-damaging stock-market–driven
short-termism is strong and convincing, or weak and contradicted.
*
*
*
The roadmap for this Article: In Part I, I review the thinking of those who
see stock market short-termism as a major problem for the economy, one that
requires lawmakers to shield executives from market pressure.
I briefly review the micro studies that examine short- or long-run propensity,
firm-by-firm, then show the previously unremarked methodological problem:
evidence for stock market short-termism harming a category of public firms need
not imply harm to the overall economy. Even if some public firms are too shortterm, others need not be. And the economy-wide problem is severe if and only if
other organizational forms outside the public markets—like venture capital and
private equity—are inferior. This is a major limitation to showing economy-wide
short-termism and is still not yet well recognized.
In Part II, I examine the predicted impact of shortening corporate horizons.
R&D spending should be down compared to where it should be. Where it should
be is hard to assess, but whether it’s down or not is not: R&D has been steadily
rising. The rise in stock buybacks should be destroying corporate America’s cash
position according to the conventional story, but it is not; long-term borrowing is
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rising in tandem with buybacks. Available cash is up, not down. Capital spending
is down, but its fall is a worldwide phenomenon, not an American one; firms that
lack American-style stock market pressures in Germany, Japan, and the rest of
developed Europe and Asia are not outpacing America in capital expenditures.
And the stock market strongly supports long-term, R&D-oriented, innovationbased companies like Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft—the five
biggest American public firms by stock market capitalization.
Hence, every major predicted consequence from the short-term argument
either has not been shown (where is there a discernible economy-wide hit to
R&D?), is false (cash is not draining out and the stock market is not shunning
long-term firms), or is better explained otherwise (capital expenditures are
down even where stock markets are less important).
Inability to detect an effect need not mean the effect is absent; the effect
could be buried. But as of now, those promoting the short-termist thesis have
not shown where it’s buried and whether what is buried is big. Moreover, a look
at the basic economy-wide evidence and the logic of markets and competition
points to an economy that is allocating innovation to private, venture capital
firms that go public if they succeed, that is borrowing more when interest rates
are low, and that invests less when the economy weakens and more when it
strengthens. It is not a picture of a highly dysfunctional capital market.
In Part III, I suggest why the economy-wide results fail to support shortterm theory. The idea, I reemphasize, is not that there is no U.S. corporate
short-termism. Businesspeople make mistakes and short-termism is only one
of many. But the economy is an ecosystem: even if some public firms invest
less in R&D and new capital, others pick up the slack, reduce the economywide setback, and are often the best place for R&D innovation. Second, the
objected-to investor pressure could be pushing firms to step back from poor
long-term decisions that should be reversed. Third, the big picture reveals
features that fit the data better: Post-industrial production needs fewer hard
assets; hence, lower investment in hard assets, more spending on R&D.
Decreased competition, which is plausible, would also induce decreased
capital investment. Mistakenly diagnosing an investment shortfall as due to
stock market short-termism readily leads to mistaken remedies.
That leads to a subtler, but deeper explanatory possibility. Perhaps the
widespread belief in stock market short-termism is a reaction to disruptive
change. If so, then the foundational short-term problem is not that stock market
pressure dislodges firms from the right technological path, but that it forces
faster and deeper change than before, which induces negative reaction in
corporate, employment, judicial, and political circles. More people feel more
vulnerable. Sharper technological shifts and enhanced global competition are
the cause; stock markets are the messenger. This idea can be captured by
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contrasting Schumpeter’s concepts of creative destruction with Polanyi’s
concepts of reaction against markets that disrupted settled ways of life. The
rhetoric of short-termism can be the most politically acceptable way to criticize
Wall Street influence and the job uncertainty for the average worker; it is a tool
to attack the shareholder-centric, profits-oriented view of the firm.
I then conclude. If the short-term criticism is correct, what consequences
should we see in nationwide data and do we see them? Short-termist theory says
that stock market short-termism induces public firms to do less R&D, to buy back
stock and kill their cash position, and to slash capital expenditures. Consequently,
we should see declining R&D compared to what it should have been, cash draining
from the corporate sector, few large firms oriented to the technological long-term,
no new public firms with low profits and only a promising future, and capital
spending in other developed nations that is heavier than America’s. But none of
these consequences have been shown, several are contradicted by the data, and a
look at several paints a picture of a satisfactorily functioning capital market.
Lawmakers, academics, and policy pundits whose thinking derives from a
deep belief in pervasive stock-market–driven short-termism should take a
step back and evaluate the extent of any economy-wide impact. They should
reconsider their views, adjust them, and perhaps reverse several.
I. THE INCREASINGLY SHORT-TERM STOCK MARKET AND THE
THEORY OF ITS DELETERIOUS ECONOMIC IMPACT
The view is widespread that the stock market has become vociferously
short-term in its demands on corporate executives, thereby deleteriously
affecting the economy.
The predicates propelling short-termism are straightforward: increasingly
rapid stock trading and sharply rising activist pressure on public firms. These
powerful predicates lead to pernicious economy-wide results: Firms cut expensive
capital spending (cheating themselves out of the productive cutting edge). They
buy back stock (stripping themselves of cash for investment). And then they drop
R&D projects (which cost something today for an uncertain future benefit) or
never start them. The stock market shuns future-oriented firms. These channels
are core to the claim of those who see stock-market–driven short-termism as
degrading the economy overall. I detail their views in the paragraphs that follow.
Wall Street, looking for a quick profit, undermines corporate executives at
public companies from investing for the long term, it’s said. One bad quarter for
a sound company leads senior management to lay off loyal long-term employees
from jobs that the employees do well. Another bad quarter puts the executives’
own posts at risk. Public firms cut R&D because spending there cuts this year’s
profits, and stock analysts want profits this quarter, not two years hence.
Managers buy back their companies’ stock to boost stock price now, wasting cash
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that should be invested in new plant and equipment. “[T]here . . . is widespread
consensus among managers [and] boards . . . that . . . short-term pressures . . .
are causing boards and managers to manage their companies suboptimally . . . .”4
And the problem is getting worse.5 Frenzied stock trading makes stock
prices reflect the latest tidbit of information, not the company’s long-term
prospects. Accelerating trading makes managers manage mainly for this
quarter. With R&D slashed, the nation’s economic future is being mortgaged
for the quick dollar that stockholders demand, one that “loot[s] the future.”6
Business leaders see the problem as serious. The World Economic Forum,
an influential international organization, viewed combatting short-termism
as one of its five leadership priorities for 2017.7 Its international council of
business leaders at its 2017 annual meeting criticized firms and shareholders
for being distracted by short-term financial gains. These leaders want the
corporate board, not shareholders, to be the central decisionmaker on longterm value creation,8 presumably because they see the board to be long-run
oriented and the shareholders not to be.9
Prominent business, academic, and labor leaders, working through the
influential Aspen Institute, attacked investor-based short-termism as
disincentivizing healthy economic growth,10 as did the Conference Board, an

4 Steven Rosenblum, Corporations: The Short-Termism Debate, 85 MISS. L.J. 697, 710 (2016). Mr.
Rosenblum, a Wachtell Lipton partner, often comments on corporate short-termism.
5 See Richard Davies, Andrew G. Haldane, Mette Nielsen & Silvia Pezzini, Measuring the Costs of ShortTermism, 12 J. FIN. STABILITY 16, 20 (2014) (calling short-termism a “disease”); Alfred Rappaport, The
Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 2015, at 65 (“‘Short-termism’
is the disease; earnings and tracking error are the carriers.”); Andrew Haldane, Executive Director, Financial
Stability, Bank of England, Address at the Oxford China Business Forum: Patience and Finance (Sept. 9,
2010) (transcript available at www.bis.org/review/r100909e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S2n-3T9X]).
6 Edward Luce, US Share Buybacks Loot the Future: Corporate Leaders Should Put Long-Term
Growth Ahead of Quick Gains, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/1aaac576-e9bb
-11e4-a687-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/983J-228N].
7 Klaus Schwab, Five Leadership Priorities for 2017, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 2, 2017),
www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/five-leadership-priorities-for-2017/ [https://perma.cc/4YB9-QLAS].
More precisely, myopic short-termism was seen as the first structural flaw in market capitalism overall.
8 WORLD ECON. F., The Compact for Responsive and Responsible Leadership: A Roadmap for Sustainable
Long-Term Growth and Opportunity (Nov. 30, 2016), www3.weforum.org/docs/Media/AM17/The_Compact
_for_Responsive_and_Responsible_Leadership_09.01.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9DV-FLNP].
9 Sarah Bostwick Stromoski, The World Economic Forum 2017 Cheat Sheet, COMM.
ENCOURAGING CORP. PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 6, 2017), http://cecp.co/world-economic-forum-2017cheat-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/27H7-USYN].
10 ASPEN INST., Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment
and Business Management 2 (Sept. 2009), www.assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/
docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K425-4FEB] (detailing the Institute’s
views on the negative impact of short-termism).
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organization of leading corporate executives.11 Commentators at the Brookings
Institution, the prestigious Washington think tank, pushed forward the idea that
“incentives [now] favor[] short-term gains over long-term growth . . . . They are:
[t]he proliferation of stock buybacks[,] . . . [t]he fixation on quarterly earnings . . .
[and t]he rise of activist investors.”12 “Stock buybacks . . . are rendering firms
unable to engage in productive investments because there is no capital leftover for
other investment opportunities or for other corporate stakeholders.”13
Management journals urge executives to “fight the tyranny of shorttermism.”14 The Business Roundtable—an organization of large public
company executives—and the National Association of Corporate Directors
lament that excessive short-term focus is destroying value.15 Respected
business leaders write in the Wall Street Journal on behalf of the Business
Roundtable, under the headline “Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy.”16
Chairs of Wall Street’s regulator, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), both Democratic and Republican, attack trading markets
as shortening corporate time horizons,17 justifying rules that insulate boards
from markets. A Republican SEC commissioner states that unfortunately
there seems to be a predominance of short-term thinking [in corporate America]
at the expense of long-term investing. [Stock market] activists . . . drive a shortterm pop in value: spinning off a profitable division, beginning a share buy-back
program, or slashing capital expenditures or research and development expenses.
Having inflated current returns by eliminating corporate investments for the
future, these activists can exit their investment and move on.18
11 Donna Dabney et al., Is Short-Term Behavior Jeopardizing the Future Prosperity of Business?, THE
CONF. ROOM 3 (Oct. 30, 2015), www.conference-board.org/publications/ publicationdetail.cfm?pub
licationid=5041&centerId=5 [https://perma.cc/MZW2-KK2T].
12 William A. Galston & Elaine Kamarck, More Builders and Fewer Traders: A Growth Strategy for the
American Economy, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/more-builders-andfewer-traders-a-growth-strategy-for-the-american-economy/ [https://perma.cc/N9GL-BL4V].
13 LENORE PALLADINO, ROOSEVELT INST., STOCK BUYBACKS: DRIVING A HIGH-PROFIT,
LOW-WAGE ECONOMY 2 (2018).
14 Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 85, 86-88.
15 NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE 2015 NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION:
THE BOARD AND LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION 2 (2015); Dean Krehmeyer, Matthew Orsagh &
Kurt N. Schacht, CFA Inst. Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. Integrity & Bus. Roundtable Inst. for Corp. Ethics,
Breaking the Short-Term Cycle 1 (2006).
16 Jamie Dimon & Warren E. Buffett, Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy, WALL ST. J., June
7, 2018, at A17.
17 See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission) (“[S]hort-termism . . . afflicts our markets overall.”); Ben Ashwell,
Business Leaders Eye Steps Toward Long-Termism, IR MAG. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.irmagazine.com/buyside/business-leaders-eye-steps-toward-long-termism (depicting SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, a Republican
appointee, participating in an investor summit on how firms can become more focused on the long term).
18 Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Stanford
Directors’ College: Activism, Short-Termism, and the SEC (June 23, 2015) (transcript available at
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National political leaders, such as former vice-president Joe Biden, say the
same.19 Democratic and Republican sponsors describe their anti–hedge fund bill
as a “bipartisan reform to protect Main St from Wall St hedge funds” and “fight
against increasing short-termism in our economy” due to predatory activists
“demand[ing] short-term returns like buybacks at the expense of investments in
workers, R&D and the company’s long-term future.”20 The Senators state:
[A] growing chorus . . . believe[s] short-termism is holding America back
. . . . [S]hort-termism . . . is the focus on short time horizons by both
corporate managers and financial markets. It results in corporate funds being
used for payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks rather
than investment in workers, R&D, infrastructure, and long-term success.21

Blue ribbon, government-sponsored studies attack stock-market–driven shorttermism, concluding that “it is essential that markets work in the public interest
and for the long term rather than focusing only on short-term returns . . . . The
effects of short-termism [are] damaging to the economy as a whole.” These problems
emanate primarily from activist investors and uninformed shareholders.22
Leo Strine, Delaware’s respected chief justice, excoriates financial shorttermism as undermining American economic well-being.23 “[D]irectors are
increasingly vulnerable to pressure from activist investors . . . with short-

www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html [https://perma.cc/ER8Z-SFU7]).
Gallagher was an SEC Commissioner from 2011 to 2015.
19 See, e.g., Joe Biden, How Short-Termism Saps the Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2016, at A13 (“Shorttermism—the notion that companies forgo long-run investment to boost near-term stock price—is one of
the greatest threats to America’s enduring prosperity.”); see also Short-Termism in Financial Markets: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Pol’y of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010)
(statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown, Chairman, S. Subcomm. On Econ. Pol’y) (“[O]bsession with quarterly
results, the short-term expectations from the world of finance, which too often sacrifice long-term economic
growth and job creation. Short-termism involves a tradeoff between long-term productivity and fast cash.”).
20 Sens. Tammy Baldwin & David Perdue, Brokaw Act: Bipartisan Reform to Protect Main St from
Wall St Hedge Funds, BALDWIN (Aug. 31, 2017), www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Brokaw%20Act%20OnePager.pdf [https://perma.cc/44D7-KBAV].
21 Sens. Tammy Baldwin & Jeff Merkley, The Problem of Short-Termism & Activist Hedge Funds,
BALDWIN (MAR. 17, 2016), www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3.7.16%20-%20Brokaw%20Act
%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHY7-UJZB].
22 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY
16, 35-36 (2015) (Lawrence H. Summers & Ed Balls, Comm. Chairs) (emphasis added).
23 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to
Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1083 (2016) (outlining,
in off-the-bench writings, a policy agenda “that would better promote a sustainable, long-term
commitment to economic growth in the United States); cf. Steve Denning, How Corporate America Is
Cannibalizing Itself, FORBES, (Nov. 18, 2015, 9:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/11
/18/how-corporate-america-is-cannibalizing-itself/#4c2799dc37e6 [https://perma.cc/6XDH-JQY6] (stating
“how share buybacks are undermining capacity to innovate and grow in the economy”).
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term objectives,” he says, “lead[ing them] to . . . sacrifice long-term
performance for short-term shareholder wealth.”24
*
*
*
The short-termism I investigate here is of stock market pressure that is
seen to induce executives to forgo long term spending on R&D and capital
(both physical and human) and to buy back their stock (and thereby lose cash
needed for the future), even if more R&D, fewer buybacks, and more capital
investment would be profitable in the long run. We can call this “Type A”
short-termism. Long-term shareholders suffer; short-term shareholders gain.
Public discourse on short-termism extends to corporate decisions that
damage the economy via environmental degradation (which boosts profits
today but degrades the economy tomorrow), an unwillingness to protect
corporate customers, employees, and other stakeholders, and an
unwillingness to act in a public-spirited way. Call this “Type B” shorttermism: to make a quick profit, too many corporations erode trust, degrade
the environment, and mistreat employees, customers, and communities. The
degradation is made no less pernicious if the company’s long-term policy is to
pollute or otherwise behave irresponsibly; it’s bad corporate behavior either
way. Shareholders and the company gain; outsiders suffer.
These two types of short-termism could both stem from the same cause—
i.e., from stock markets. Or one may cause the other: if the irresponsible firm
concludes that retribution—via fines or a poor reputation—will come later,
but additional sales with environmental degradation produce profits now, it
could pollute for Type A reasons.
No evidence that I’m aware of points to firms’ environmental degradation as
being costly in the long-term to the polluting firms overall, as opposed to being costly
to society generally in the long-term. If it were costly to the firms themselves in the
long-run, that would turn what is primarily “Type B” societal degradation shorttermism into an instance of “Type A” time-horizon short-termism.
Type B is not at its core short-termism but is the firm afflicting external
costs on others. It is no less important for the economy and polity, as I
indicate in Part III. But I focus here on the first type, examining the
economy-wide consequences we should see before concluding that “Type A”
short-termism is a fundamental economy-wide problem.

24 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761,
790-91 (2015). But cf. J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 353, 354 (2017) (“The
distinction between short-term and long-term shareholder wealth allows critics like Chief Justice Strine to
dismiss overwhelming empirical evidence that shareholders benefit, on average, from the actions of hedge
fund activists, though long-run evidence also supports the value of hedge fund activism.”).
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A. The Causes: Activists and Traders
Two financial market changes are the cause: rising shareholder activism
and increasingly rapid trading.
1. Rising activism. Recently increasing shareholder activism, it’s said,
exacerbates short-termism. No firm is immune from activist attacks, and all
firms fear them. One of Wall Street’s strongest critics of short-termism, Larry
Fink, the head of BlackRock, the huge pension and investment firm, said
recently that “[t]he role of activists is getting larger . . . .”25
2. Increased trading. Trading and turnover in the stock market is more
rapid than ever before. Executives cannot invest for the long term (it’s said)
if their ownership base turns over every few months. Ownership has shifted
from individuals who invested for the long term, without complaint, to
institutional investors like mutual funds and pension funds that want their
stocks to show profits now, not years from now.26
*
*
*
The duration of stock ownership indeed has shortened, and activism has
sharply increased. Figure 1 shows the average holding period for stocks traded
on the New York Stock Exchange. In 1980, the average holding period was
about three years; by the turn of the century it was only a year.27
Figure 1: The Shortening Holding Period for a Stock on the New York Stock Exchange28
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25 See Svea Herbst-Bayliss & Ross Kerber, BlackRock’s Fink Learns to Live with Activist Investors,
REUTERS, Nov. 13, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-investment-summit-fink-shareholders/blackrocks
-fink-learns-to-live-with-activist-investors-idUSKBN1DD2B6 [https://perma.cc/5XAK-2BPU].
26 E.g., Strine, Who Bleeds?, supra note 3, at 1939.
27 The text states the prima facie case for increased trading. In Part III.A.3., I suggest why
Figure 1 exaggerates the increased trading idea.
28 New York Stock Exchange Databank, available through the Center for Research on Security
Prices; see also Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding Long-term Investors, 25
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 38, 39 (2013).
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Activist engagements, by which an activist buys a big stock position in the
target company and seeks operating changes or board seats, are also up
sharply, as Figure 2 shows.29 They went from nearly none in the early 1990s
to 300 per year recently. And the activists’ nature changed: from pension
funds seeking a shareholder resolution but without a prospect of affecting
core corporate governance in the 1980s30 to aggressive hedge fund activists
seeking board seats and major corporate changes. Nearly 10% of all public
firms can now expect to be visited by such activists in any one year.
The foundational predicate in the short-term theory is thus supported:
the average duration of stock ownership is shortening, and activist
engagements are sharply increasing. Next: are these having the predicted
impact on economy-wide R&D, cash pressures, and capital investments?
Figure 2: Rising Incidence of High-Impact Shareholder Activism, 1994–201631

Number of Activist Engagements

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

0

29 Andrew Birstingl & Michael Coronato, 2016 Shareholder Activism Review, FACTSET RESEARCH
SYS. INC. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://insight.factset.com/hubfs/Resources/Research%20Desk/Market%20Insight/Fact
Set%27s%202016%20Year-End%20Activism%20Review_2.1.17.pdf (covering 2009–2016 and defining “[h]igh
impact activism” as campaigns in which an objective is: “board control, board representation, to maximize
shareholder value, to remove officer(s)/director(s), or a public short/bear raid”). To go further back, we turned
to Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism Updated 19 (Sept. 2, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~brav/HFactivism_SEPTEMBER_2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FQ94-435L] (indicating a lower number of activist engagements in 2009–2011 than FactSet reports).
We also use Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical
Evidence, 2 CONTEMP. FIN. DIGEST, Autumn 1998, at 10-34; Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Starks, Corporate
Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 283 (2000).
30 Gillian & Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism, supra note 29, at 30.
31 See supra note 29 for the data sources.
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B. The Consequences: Slashed Investment, Cash Drained by Buybacks, and
Cutbacks in R&D
Activists’ increasing strength and burgeoning trading induce firms to
sharply cut R&D, to drain cash by stock buybacks, and to cripple investment
in new property, plant, and equipment.
1. Capital cutbacks due to stock market short-termism. If the publicly traded
firm invests in a new five- or ten-year factory, the critics’ thinking runs, the
stock market will punish the company, its stock price, and its executives.
Purveyors of the view point to a decline in investing in new plant and
equipment. In 2003, 33% of the S&P 500’s operating cash flow was invested
in the company’s property, plant and equipment; by 2013, only 29%.32
Declining investment is a stock market-induced problem that’s getting worse.
2. More stock buybacks lead to less cash to invest. The stock buyback is a new
short-termist flash point. Executives, relentlessly pressured by stockholders
for cash, make their company buy back stock, burning cash such that the firm
must skimp on R&D and on paying employees well. Investment suffers, and
business contracts.33 “[B]uybacks are killing the American economy.”34
3. Decreasing R&D. Firms are killing their futures by cutting R&D
because R&D expenses reduce profits now, but their benefit from better
products comes in the future. Stockholders want cash now, so executives
acquiesce. If they do not, activists will force them out. Stock markets punish
firms that ramp up their R&D.35
4. Shunned future-oriented public firms. The stock market does not support
firms that are oriented to the future and not just to the next quarter.

32 John C. Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 580 (2016).
33 See JONATHAN HASKEL & STIAN WESTLAKE, CAPITALISM WITHOUT CAPITAL: THE RISE OF
THE INTANGIBLE ECONOMY 168 (2018) (“[I]nstead of investing, there are signs companies are giving money
back to shareholders . . . .”); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 32-34 (2015); Coffee & Palia, supra note 32, at 552 (“[T]he increasing
rate of hedge fund activism is beginning to compel corporate boards and managements to forego long-term
investments (particularly in R&D) in favor of a short-term policy of maximizing shareholder payout.”).
34 Nick Hanauer, Stock Buybacks Are Killing the American Economy, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/kill-stock-buyback-to-save-the-american-economy/385259.
35 E.g., William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV, Sept. 2014, at 50
(claiming that “[t]rillions of dollars that could have been spent on innovation and job creation . . .
have instead been used to buy back shares”); Rosenblum, supra note 4, at 708; Alana Semuels, Can
America’s Companies Survive America’s Most Aggressive Investors?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/activist-investors/506330 (“[A]ctivist investors are . . .
forcing [legacy corporations] to trim payrolls and downsize research operations—and, quite possibly,
damaging the entire economy.”); Robert Ayres & Michael Olenick, Secular Stagnation (Or
Corporate Suicide?) 1 (July 11, 2017) (working paper), available at https://ruayres.wordpress.com
/2017/07/11/secular-stagnation-or-corporate-suicide/ [https://perma.cc/FPA8-8E66] (asserting that
“buybacks . . . effectively reduce corporate R&D”).
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C. Firm-by-Firm Evidence
Academic analysis of short-termism is mostly at the firm level: are firms
in one category or another—activist-influenced, quarterly-oriented,
institutional-investor-owned—more short term than firms outside the
category? This literature is extensive but disputed.36 Some researchers find
that public firms invest less than privately owned counterparts;37 others find,
in contradiction, that stronger institutional investor presence increases R&D
spending.38 Some researchers find that shareholder activists do not sacrifice
long-term results;39 others find, in contradiction, that activism improves
short-term but not long-term results.40 In separate work, I conclude that the
36 For reviews, see Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68
BUS. LAW. 977, 986–87, 996–98 (2013); Andrew Bird, Aytekin Ertan, Stephen A. Karoyli & Thomas G.
Ruchti, Short-Termism Spillovers from the Financial Industry 5 (June 2017) (working paper), available at
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2859169 [https://perma.cc/9E7X-67FT]; Albert Sheen, Do Public and Private
Firms Behave Differently? An Examination of Investment in the Chemical Industry 2 (Mar. 23, 2016)
(working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2792410 [https://perma.cc/BB2Y-D253].
37 See, e.g., John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment and Stock
Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 342 (2015); cf. Alexandre Garel, Myopic Market Pricing
and Managerial Myopia, 44 J. BUS. FIN. ACCT. 1194, 1204-09 (2017) (producing evidence that myopic stock
investors induce R&D cutbacks). For contrary findings, see Vojislav Maksimovic, Gordon Phillips & Liu
Yang, Do Public Firms Respond to Investment Opportunities More Than Private Firms? (Dec. 15, 2017)
(working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3093125 [https://perma.cc/CR9C-JHC8], and Naomi
Feldman et al., The Long and the Short of It: Do Public and Private Firms Invest Differently?
(SSRN working paper, Aug. 2018), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3239663.
38 Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, Innovation and Institutional Ownership,
103 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 302 (2013); Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors
Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 307 (2000). See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Song Ma
& Xuan Tiam, How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation? J. FIN. ECON.
(forthcoming 2018) (finding that firms that activists target cut R&D spending, but their R&D
becomes more effective); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 53 J. FIN. 1729, 1729 (2008) (finding that
activist hedge funds generally improve operating performance).
39 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015); Edward P. Swanson & Glen M. Young, Are Activist Investors
Good or Bad for Business? Evidence from Capital Market Prices, Informed Traders, and Firm Fundamentals
(Mar. 2017) (working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2823067 [http://perma.cc/PQB7D3WQ] (“We find short-window returns around the announcement of an activist share purchase are
sizable and do not reverse in a two-year post-intervention period.”). For a discussion of why
autonomous boards do not promote the long term, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2013).
40 See Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund
Activism and Long-Term Firm Value 1, 28 (2015) (working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2693231 [https://perma.cc/6U72-564R] (finding that activists hurt innovative firms). But
see Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism: A Reply to Cremers, Giambona, Sepe & Wang, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/ 12/10/the-long-term-effects-ofhedge-fund-activism-a-reply-to-cremers-giambona-sepe-and-wang/ [https://perma.cc/KED5-DZCM]
(criticizing Cremers et al. and seeking, but being unable to, replicate their results). To assess
activists’ impact, researchers match firms with activist interventions with similar firms without
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best interpretation of the firm-by-firm evidence is that stock markets do not
overall strongly denigrate long-term value and probably enhance it.
I pursue a different analytic channel here. If firm-by-firm short-term problems
that critics have proffered were severe system-wide problems, then the critics
should be able to show economy-wide degradation in the R&D, buyback, and
capital spending channels. And, even if large public firms failed to manage for the
long-term, that could just mean that private firms and venture-capital-backed
firms are better innovators. The venture capital and private equity industries
profit by successfully doing what public firms do not. Short-term theorists need
to address whether private firms are just better at the task and whether, even if not
better, they are picking up much of any purported public firm long-term slack.
This is not to reject the firm-by-firm studies; finding or refuting a
marginal impact from shareholder activism or from rapid trading is useful.
Much knowledge marches forward at the margin. But local studies cannot be
dispositive as to economy-wide degradation because they cannot tell us
enough about the strength of any economy-wide impact.
Another way to grasp this problem on the disjunction between the local
and the general: Posit that firm-by-firm studies show that public firms invest
less if their stock trades more. That could lead to two propositions that seem
so close that many, in my experience, think them identical:
1. When trading increases in a company’s stock, that causes the affected
firms’ investment to decline.
2. When trading increases in the economy, that causes economy-wide
investment to decline.
Or, another set:
1. Stock market activists force cash out of their target firms.
2. Increasing activism starves the corporate sector of cash for investment.
Or:
1. Increasing quarterly orientation (and increased trading and more
activism) induces affected public firms to do less R&D.
2. Because of the strong quarterly orientation, increased trading, and
rise in activism, the U.S. economy is doing less R&D than it should.
Even if the first propositions are true, the underlying rationale could be
that the affected firms are not making good investments, are not the best place
for cash, and are not doing good R&D. And even if the first propositions were
true, the second propositions are, in order, probably false, demonstrably false,
and not shown to be true. Part II shows this and Part III assesses why.
Analysis and policy thinking need to avoid a fallacy of composition.

activists and examine their paths over the years. The matching is hard to construct and the results
tend not to change people’s prior beliefs.
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II. LOOKING FOR STOCK MARKET SHORT-TERMISM’S ECONOMYWIDE IMPACT
Activist engagements increased sharply in recent decades, just as shortterm theory predicts. Basic measures of stock market turnover and the
duration of stock ownership also support the theory.
However, the predicted consequences cannot be found in economy-wide data:
Capital spending is down since the financial crisis, but it is hard to attribute this
to trading or activism, because the worldwide capital spending trend for
developed economies similarly tilts downward, even for economies not as
dependent as the United States on the stock market. Moreover, American
capacity utilization—how intensely existing capital stock is deployed—has been
slow to recover from the 2008–2009 recession; it has not been economical to
invest more in capital equipment for the past decade and will not be until existing
stock is used efficiently. Buybacks increased after the 2008–2009 financial crisis,
but the cash used to buy stock was offset by cash from new low-interest rate
borrowings, with the two roughly equal in size. The expected sharp cutback from
the best level of R&D has not been shown. The five companies most strongly
supported by the stock market are tech-based, long-term firms.
In short, short-term theory is either unsupported (R&D), contradicted
(buybacks as draining cash, stock markets as shunning the future), or better
explained otherwise (capital expenditure). True, such economy-wide evidence is
crude. Perhaps a pernicious short-term impact is buried in the data. Perhaps stock
markets degrade R&D, cash positions, and capital expenditures, while offsetting
economic features buttress them. But policymakers should hesitate before acting
against stock-market–driven short-termism on the evidence available, as it does
not indicate a severe economy-wide problem.
A. Capital Expenditure Cutbacks Around the World
In the past decade a smaller fraction of public firms’ operating cash flow
is being reinvested in new property, plant, and equipment.41 Major scholars
cite this as demonstrating that stock-market–driven short-termism is severely
degrading the economy.42 Figure 3 initially confirms this view.
41 Vipal Monga, David Benoit, & Theo Francis, As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend More on
Buybacks than Factories, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2015, at A1.
42 Coffee & Palia, supra note 32, at 553 & nn. 137–138. For important similar views, see Rosenblum,
supra note 4, at 709 (“If you miss your quarterly earnings, you get punished . . . . [Boards] want to invest
for the long term . . . but they [are] constrained [to] meet[] their quarterly earnings, and that . . . is not
healthy for companies in the long term . . . .”); J.W. MASON, UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERMISM 4
(Roosevelt Inst. Rep., 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute. org/understanding-short-termism-questionsand-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/2HNT-BEGS]; Galston & Kamarck, supra note 12, at 8; Martin
Lipton, Empiricism and Experience; Activism and Short-Termism; the Real World of Business, HARV. L. SCH.
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Figure 3: Capital Expenditure in the United States, 1970–2016, Scaled to GDP43
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But recovery from the post-2008–2009 recession was steady but weak.
The graphic points to lower capital investment as a response to an economic
crisis and recession, not a sudden response to an onslaught of stock market
short-termism. An improving economy that uses a greater portion of its
existing capital equipment should start to invest more in capital equipment.44
There’s little reason to invest in new equipment when old equipment lies
fallow because the firm faces weak demand and the equipment is not yet
technologically passé. But capacity utilization was still only 75% in January
2017, down from the pre-crisis 81%.45 Factory utilization had still not
recovered from the crisis, when it plummeted to below 70%. This was a
substantial decline in capacity utilization. For the past quarter-century it had
never gone above 86% nor below 69.95%.
F. ON CORP. GOV. (Oct 28, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/28/empiricism-and-exper
ience-activism-and-short-termism-the-real-world-of-business/ [https://perma.cc/JZ29-40TV].
43 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Table 5.2.5 Gross and Net Domestic Investment, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMM., https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/national [https://perma.cc/J5K7-C5MY] (last
visited Jan. 8, 2018). Inquiry typically scales capital expenditure by cash flow. I scale to GDP to
facilitate comparison in Figure 4 with the OECD’s GDP-scaled data on other nations’ capital
expenditures. Scaling by cash flow yields a similarly declining trend. See infra Appendix Figure 8. An
astute conceptual criticism of the Department of Commerce capital expenditures data is that it now
includes investment in intellectual property products, like film, thereby masking a steeper decline in
traditional plant and equipment. See MASON, supra note 42, at 7-8. Subtracting the category including
film shows a similar, but slightly sharper, downward trend. See infra Appendix Figure 9.
44 JONATHAN GOLUB ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE U.S. EQUITY STRATEGY (2018) (reporting twenty
percent increased capital expenditures in the United States in year-to-year preliminary first quarter 2018 data).
45 BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS, at 54-55 www.federalreserve.gov/ rele
ases/g17/ipdisk/utl_sa.txt [https://perma.cc/4G2Q-WMWK] (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
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Figure 4: U.S. Capacity Utilization, 1986–201746
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For a firm to invest in new equipment that cannot be used well would be
corporate empire building and waste such as that which many observers long
thought afflicted the public firm.47 Figure 4 shows the Federal Reserve’s data
on capacity utilization, which measures what portion of American industrial
capacity is actually being used by business. Utilization declined sharply in
2008 and has not fully recovered. The recession and the lengthy recovery
could explain weakness in capital spending in the United States better than
stock-market–driven short-termism. From this possibility, a prediction
emerges: as and if the economy’s recovery continues, firms will invest more
in capital equipment than during the past decade.
*
*
*
A critic could question here what causes what. Could stock-market–driven
short-termism have weakened the demand for new plant and equipment? And
with that demand low, could economic activity consequentially have
weakened and stayed weak?
But stock market short-termism as the start here is implausible. The decline was
sharpest during the financial crisis and recession, which was caused primarily by a
real estate bubble that burst and crippled first financial firms from lending and then
sharply slowed the real economy, according to the consensus view. More generally,
economists who see business investment as important to economic recovery look to
fiscal, monetary, and tax policy as the impetus, not corporate governance.48
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) (criticizing manager-controlled corporations’ excessive spending in the 1980s).
48 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 560-62, 715-18, 756, 758-59 (7th ed. 2015).
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*
*
*
Another approach helps to assess how well stock market short-term
pressures explain declining American capital expenditures. If American
traders and activists are thwarting capital expenditures, then the decline in
U.S. capital expenditures should be sharper than that in the rest of the
developed world. The stock market is a major channel for corporate finance
in the United States and is a less important channel elsewhere.
Figure 5 compiles data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)—the post–World War II rich nations’ club. The first
graphic at the left is capital expenditure in the OECD (but without the United
States); its decline parallels that of the United States—sloping slightly downward
until the financial crisis, then deteriorating sharply. The bottom graphics show
declining capital expenditure in Germany and Japan, for specificity.
The data includes capital expenditures beyond those of large public
companies, which are the short-term theory’s target for criticism. Because
this wider database also shows a long-term decline in capital equipment
spending in and around the developed world, the case for shareholder
pressure being the core motivating force weakens. Capital spending is
declining even when including non–stock market sectors.
Comparing capital spending trends between the United States and one or two
nations is not probative, since national economies differ in so many ways that it’s
hard to control for it all. That though is not the comparison here: capital
expenditures declined across the entire developed world. When a trend
characterizes both a nation with strong stock markets, like the United States, and
all the other developed nations that do not have similarly strong stock markets, then
concluding that American capital expenditures decline is strongly due to United
States–specific trading markets is a logical jump.49 Capital expenditures declined
in the United States at about half the rate as it did in the rest of the OECD.50
True, activists are not absent in other nations, and stock markets play an
increasing role abroad. Financialization is a worldwide phenomenon leading
See infra Figure 5, top left graphic, for the OECD’s four-decade capital expenditures trend.
See infra Appendix Figure 1. Capital expenditures declined more sharply than in the United
States in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Capital expenditures for Australia declined less and for
Turkey—which was the only lesser developed nation then in the OECD—it did not decline.
The cross-country picture for R&D is, in contrast, mixed. Some developed nations’ R&D/GDP
ratio exceeds the American; most are lower. Several nations’ R&D/GDP growth exceeds that of the
United States. ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., LEVEL OF GDP PER CAPITA & PRODUCTIVITY,
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV [https://perma.cc/XH9S-KWTW]. The
average OECD R&D/GDP rise is less than that of the United States when the individual nations’
R&D/GDP are averaged; when R&D spending and GDP are pooled, more heavily weighting larger
economies like Germany, the non-OECD rise is somewhat steeper than the United States.
49
50

2018]

91

Stock Market Short-Termism's Impact

even private companies to focus more than before on the financial bottom line.
But differences in stock market dependence, in stockholder activism, and in the
depth of financialization between the United States and the others persist and
are not trivial. Something other than stock market financial pressure would be
the primary cause, if the phenomenon is as powerful outside of the stockmarket–driven, heavily financialized economies such as the United States.
Figure 5: Capital Expenditure Trends in the Developed World
Similar to the U.S. Trend51
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The upper left graphic averages gross investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) from
1970 to 2015 for all nations that were OECD members in 1990, other than the United States. (After 1990,
the OECD added some developing nations; 1990 membership is a common way to focus on developed
nations.) The U.S. decline, pictured next, is a version of Figure 3. Its decline is not sharper than that of the
rest of the developed world. Below those two are graphics that show, for concreteness, declining investment
in Germany and Japan since 1970. (The Japanese graphic is scaled differently because its sharper capital
expenditures decline was from a higher level in the early 1970s.)

51 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NE.G
DI.FTOT.ZS?end=2016&start=1960&view=char [https://perma.cc/6XBT-UFWD] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
Standard and Poor’s did a similar comparison, showing North American capital expenditures moving in
tandem with the rest of the world’s. STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPEX
SURVEY 2015, www.maalot.co.il/publications/FTS20150804101404.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PJR-V4A6].
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The two large economies with rising capital expenditures are China and
India.52 Much manufacturing can now be done more effectively in nations outside
the OECD, helping to explain declining capital expenditures in the OECD.
For the stock market short-termism story as provoking economy-wide
harm to be taken more seriously, its proponents need to explain why other
nations without American-style stock markets are cutting capital spending
more sharply than the United States.
B. Buybacks and Borrowings After the Financial Crisis
Stock buybacks increased during the past decade, just as the short-term
theory predicts. But have the buybacks starved corporate America for cash,
setting up the predicate for slashed R&D and capital investment?
Figure 6: Rise in Buybacks in the S&P 500 Nonfinancial Firms, 1985–201653
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The answer again is no. Buybacks are up, as Figure 6 shows, but the
buyback process is not draining cash.
After the 2009 financial crisis, corporate borrowings increased greatly, at
a pace about that of stock buybacks.54 With post-crisis interest rates at longterm lows, many firms could borrow long-term nearly for free, and did so.
Some then bought back stock, so that their cash position after the buyback
See infra Appendix Figure 10. India’s rises overall but declines recently.
S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE, http://www.compustat.com [https://perma.cc/8W
M8-MRHT] (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
54 Adrian Van Rixtel & Alan Villegas, Equity Issuance and Share Buybacks, BIS Q. REV., Mar.
2015, at 28-29 (showing that net bond issuance proceeds of U.S. nonfinancial corporations rise in
tandem with share buybacks for the Standard & Poor’s 1500).
52
53
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was not the cash spent for the stock, but the amount spent minus the cash
coming in from increased borrowing. Properly conceived, corporate America
recapitalized its balance sheet with cheap debt.55
Figure 7 incorporates another evaluative fact: S&P 500 companies also
sell and issue stock, so we adjust the buybacks to net buybacks, deducting
cash received for newly issued stock (which is about $100 billion annually).
Figure 7: Rise in Both Net Stock Buybacks and in Net Borrowing in the
S&P 500, 1985–201656
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The increased borrowing, which brings cash into the firm, approximates the
size of net stock buybacks, which has cash leaving the firm. Worldwide evidence
shows that buybacks increase with low interest rates (and decrease with high
rates).57 About 30% of payouts have been directly financed with new debt issued

55 In equilibrium, debt and equity has the same cost to the firm. Franco Modigliani & Merton
H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV.
261, 261-62 (1958). The Fed’s suppression of interest rates to near-zero upset any prior equilibrium;
firms then recapitalized (and the stock market repriced equity) until reaching a new equilibrium.
56 S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE, supra note 53.
57 Assia Elgouacem & Riccardo Zago, Share Buybacks, Monetary Policy and the Cost of Debt 22 (May 14,
2018) (working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3032534 [https://perma.cc/U8ZY-YGNP]; cf.
Joan Farre-Mensa, Roni Michaely & Martin Schmalz, Financing Payouts 6 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Paper No.
1263, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032534 [https://perma.cc/6GJ3-RSZL] (discussing how “debt
appears to be the dominant form of payout financing” and presenting data “that firms use debt-financed
payouts to take advantage of market timing opportunities,” such as government interest rate policies).
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simultaneously,58 and many firms have otherwise been borrowing more long
term at low interest. As a Fed governor said, the post-crisis economy had an
“unusually large divergence in the costs of debt and equity—due in part to the
cumulative effects of our [very large purchases of debt, which] is likely [to]
make[] debt-financed repurchases of equity attractive.”59
Substituting debt for equity will lead some firms to have too much debt;
the rise in debt subjects other firms to the discipline of having to roll over or
repay. Regardless of whether advantageous or not, this is not the short-term
destruction of the firms’ cash for investment. It is a recapitalization from
equity to debt when long-term debt is cheap.60 This interest rate motivation
for the last decade’s buyback wave should lead buyback by borrowing to slow
or stop when interest rates rise back to normal levels.
The effects of the end-of-2017 tax law (which facilitated cash moving from
foreign subsidiaries back to the United States) are cross-cutting: buybacks
should rise due to the immediate surge of cash returning to the United States
from abroad, which the act facilitated.61 Much cash in large public firms,
illustrated in Appendix Figure 6, was held abroad.62 In time, the tax law’s
reduced corporate tax rate should dampen borrowing-fueled buybacks
because the after-tax value of debt will decline relative to equity. Regardless,
as of now, the cash drainage story is incorrect.
*
*
*
Here, I have analyzed the buyback/borrowing trend as an economy-wide
post-crisis capital structure decision: the corporate sector substituted lowinterest debt for equity. Precise work from Jesse Fried and Charles Wang
takes a different approach, examining buybacks as only part of the cash
58 See id. at 11 (demonstrating that “in the average year, 30% of aggregate total payouts are
financed via simultaneous net debt issues”; payouts are primarily buybacks).
59 Jeremy C. Stein, Governor, Fed. Res. System Address at the Boston University/Boston Federal
Reserve System, Conference on Macro-Finance Linkages: Large-Scale Asset Purchases (Nov. 30, 2012),
available at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20121130a.htm [https://perma.cc/PK3H-MRKU];
see also Farre-Mensa et al., supra note 57, at 5, 29; Valeriy Zakamulin & Arngrim Hunnes, Stock Earnings
and Bond Yields in the US 1871–2016: The Story of a Changing Relationship 41 (Feb. 19, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3126321 [https://perma.cc/U9SE-T4PE] (showing equity’s
dividend-to-stock-price ratio to generally be much higher than the yield on long-term debt from 1960 to
2010, but not much higher after 2010 until 2016).
60 Cf. Clifford Asness, Todd Hazelkorn & Scott Richardson, Buyback Derangement Syndrome, 44
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 50 (2018) (arguing that “a considerable portion of the recent share repurchase
activity has simply been a recapitalization, shifting from equity to debt”). For other firms,
recapitalization with more debt advantageously disciplines management. Jensen, supra note 47, at 324.
61 See Akane Otani, Richard Rubin & Theo Francis, Buybacks Surge in Wake of Tax Cuts, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 2, 2018, at A1.
62 Wells Fargo Asset Management, Tax Reform—Overseas Cash and Repatriation Implications
(2018), https://www.wellsfargofunds.com/assets/pdf/fmg/commentary/mmkt/tax-reforem-overseascash-repatriation-implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/G655-97YV].
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flowing in and out from public firms’ equity accounts.63 They show that firms
issue equity to run the firm: equity “pays” for acquisitions and compensates
employees, but such operating payments with equity are not typically counted
in equity sales. If the equity were not used to compensate or to buy, the firm
would have had to spend cash. When this equity’s value is netted against
buybacks and dividends paid, the net cash outflow diminishes noticeably.
Aggregated equity-based cash flows, including dividends, buybacks, and
issuances, were less than the $7 trillion gross payout commonly quoted for the
2007–2016 decade, netting down to a smaller $3.3 trillion64—smaller than the
gross payout, but not a small number. But apply the borrowing analysis I
raised in prior sections: even this $3.3 trillion cash payout reverses and
becomes an inflow, because low-interest long-term borrowing increased
massively, by $3.75 trillion during that decade.65 Combining the two concepts
of a recapitalization and stock as currency yields a bottom line of no public
firm net cash outflow from the two for the past decade.
*
*
*
Economic fundamentals are also in play. Money disbursed in stock buybacks
does not disappear. The cash leaves the firm and reappears elsewhere. A mutual
fund that owned the bought-back stock receives cash and then reinvests that cash
in other companies’ stocks. If the financial market is working as it should, then
the cash moves from firms with poor investment opportunities back to the mutual
fund. And then the mutual fund reinvests the cash in firms with good investment
opportunities—perhaps because they are younger with an expanding market.66 A
major part of the cash movement fits this pattern. About $250 billion of cash
flowed annually into the smaller, non-S&P 500 firms in the past decade, exceeding
the outflow from the S&P 500. Appendix Figures 4 and 5 illustrate.67
Lastly, there is a bottom line. Short-term theory’s purported economywide scourge is to sap public firms of cash, thereby crippling their capacity
for R&D, capital spending, and better operations. But cash holdings have
steadily increased in the S&P 500. Appendix Figures 6 and 7 illustrate.

63 Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Are Buybacks Really Shortchanging Investment?, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, 88, 90.
64 Id. at 92.
65 See Figure 6 to visualize the rising long-term borrowing during the period (the blue dashed line).
66 Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Activism, the Short-Termist Red-Herring, and the Need for Corporate
Governance Reform, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.clsbluesky.law. columbia.edu/2016/
03/28/shareholder-activism-the-short-termist-red-herring-and-the-need-for-corporate-governance-reform [https
://perma.cc/8Q24-K4AE] (showing that many institutional investors seeking buybacks also invest longterm otherwise, via venture capital or private equity channels).
67 See Adrian Van Rixtel & Alan Villegas, Equity Issuance and Share Buybacks, BIS Q. REV., Mar.
2015, at 28-29.
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The purported cash starvation channel from stock market short-termism
to economy-wide degradation buybacks does not exist.68
C. R&D Over the Decades
A cost of excessive stock market short-termism has been to degrade
corporate R&D, according to many critics.69 When companies report profits,
they must deduct their R&D expenses when incurred; but they report the
resulting profits in the future.70 With activism increasing so sharply during the
past few decades and with stock ownership duration decreasing so much, they
should have an impact in the nationwide data on R&D spending. Executives, I
understand, often see stock markets and activists as inducing an R&D decline.
An impact may be there, but not a cutback.
Figure 8: The Rise in R&D Spending in the United States as a Proportion of
GDP, 1977–201671
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Perhaps short-theory needs to reverse direction here, arguing that stock markets are
preventing firms from investing their cash hoard.
69 The well-known classic criticisms include: Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on
Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 330 (1998); Robert H. Hayes & William J.
Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1980; Michael E. Porter, Capital
Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 65, 67-68.
For more recent criticism, see Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 3, at 1872, 1917.
70 FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS
§ 12 (1974).
71 R&D is scaled to GDP in Figure 8. The R&D data is from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau
of Economic Analysis, a standard government source of economy-wide data. (I use government data
whenever possible in this article.) That bureau is the usual source for data on the economy’s domestic
product. For the R&D data, see Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Table 5.6.5, lines 2&6 National Income and Product
Accounts, U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, Table 5.6.5, lines 2
& 6 (2017) (last visited Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.bea.gov/itable/ [https://perma.cc/HM9A-7XM3]. For
the GDP data, see Bureau of Econ. Analysis, supra note 43, Table 1.1.5, line 1.
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Figure 8 tells the core economy-wide story. Since the 1970s R&D
spending has been steadily rising. The only major channel of R&D decline in
the United States was the falling government support for research.72
Consider another commonly used albeit crude measure of R&D output
prowess: the density of patent awards.73 Patents increased, tripling in the past
twenty-five years, as activism rose and as stock trading became more frequent.
Figure 9: Number of Patents Awarded Annually, 1963–201574
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A logically appropriate response would be that short-termism has long
been damaging. R&D and capital expenditures were anemic in 1979, weak in
1990, and still hold the economy back in 2018, they could respond.
72 That is, the graphics’ overall increase could have been due to the government spending more
while activists were crippling public firm R&D. But U.S. government spending is declining: “The
National Science Foundation estimates that [total] U.S. R&D funding reached an all-time high . . . in
2015. [But o]f that total, the federally sponsored share fell to a record-low 23 percent while the business
sector’s share rose to a record-high 69 percent.” Mike Henry, US R&D Spending at All-Time High,
Federal Share Reaches Record Low, AM. INST. PHYSICS (Nov. 8, 2016), www.aip.org/fyi/2016/us-rdspending-all-time-high-federal-share-reaches-record-low [https://perma.cc/G9QG-ENGU]. Backing out
government spending from the article’s graphics would increase the slope. Id.; see also supra Figure 1).
73 See Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1661,
1673-74 (1990); cf. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent
Citations: A First Look, 36 RAND J. ECON. 20, 33-35 (2005). Increased patents do not assuredly mean
more R&D. The extra quantity could be small-bore. More “patent trolls” could be filing a broad
spectrum of patents to squeeze payments out of users. The patent office could be more readily
awarding patents now than it was in the 1980s. See Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many
Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/.
74 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, 1963–2015, www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/JV09-H243].
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But if the short-term theory’s basic premise is true—short-termism is due
to excessive trading and too much shareholder orientation, which slam
R&D—and trading and activism have risen sharply, then one should see
consequences. As the pernicious characteristics increase, the pernicious
consequences should increase as well. If X causes Y to diminish, then more X
should lead to less Y, unless some other intervening force is affecting Y.
But we do not see that relationship, despite that the basic short-term
critique has been in play for four decades.75
Another short-termist response: This evidence could obscure that
components of overall R&D should have been rising, but fell, or should have
risen more sharply. And the stock market held them back. But the fact that
we do not see this X-increases-and-as-a-consequence-Y-declines relationship
calls into question basic tenets of the short-termist theory76 and requires a
showing or a good reason to believe that the data hides such stunted
components. That possibility faces the impediment that venture capital and
private equity profit from doing what public firms fail to do; they have reason
to fill in lagging components from public firms. To support their claim that
stock market short-termism is harming the economy, short-term theorists
would need a metric to indicate that the actual rise is insufficient.
The verdict thus far: stock-market–driven short-termism has not been
shown to be a deep economy-wide problem.
D. Does the Stock Market Support R&D-Oriented, Tech-Based Innovation?
The stock-market–driven short-termism story implies that the stock
market shuns firms with weak current earnings, because such firms are
investing deep into the future. Does this comport with basic observations?
Consider the nature of the business of the biggest public firms in the United
States. Table 1 shows the ten biggest firms by stock market capitalization.
The biggest five of these—the American companies most strongly supported
by the stock market—are Amazon, Apple, Alphabet (Google), Facebook, and
Microsoft. All are quintessential long-term companies. They do much R&D.
Their current earnings cannot justify their current stock price; only a belief
that they will grow long-term does. Each has technologies and businesses that
stock markets expect will be valuable in the future.

75 Steven Kaplan, Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some Thoughts, 18 INNOVATION
POL’Y & ECON. 107, 108-09 (2018).
76 And even if R&D spending is steady, short-term believers could investigate whether the horizon
for the R&D is shortening—i.e., spending for minor improvements on current products and not on game
changing technologies. But the short-term theorists have not brought forth such evidence and, given the
vibrancy of the venture capital industry, such evidence may well be hard to find.
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Table 1: Ten Largest U.S. Nonfinancial Public Firms,
by Stock Market Capitalization77
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Company Name

Stock Market Capitalization
(in Billions of Dollars)
1054
947
868
812
463
377
354
270
245
241

Apple
Amazon
Microsoft
Alphabet (Google)
Facebook
Johnson & Johnson
Exxon Mobil
Walmart
AT&T
Home Depot

The total 2017 earnings from these five companies were $101 billion.78
Their stock was selling at a very high thirty-five times current earnings—
showing a stock market confident in their future.79 “[T]hose five made up 15%
of the S&P’s market value, more than the entire financial, health-care or
industrial sectors.”80 Perhaps five is not enough, but this is not a vivid portrait
of a stock market that shuns future-oriented innovation.
Moreover, there’s a vibrant stock market in taking tech-oriented, researchoriented firms public. Bubbles in the dot-com boom of the 1990s and recently in
biotech show a stock market overvaluing the long term. That does not reflect a
well-functioning market, but it’s not short-termism. And as of 2018, “[b]iotech
companies have been going public at earlier stages than in the past, sometimes
without having a product or drug[.]”81 Because private companies increasingly go
public with weaker ongoing earnings,82 U.S. stock markets could be supporting
R&D, long-term investment, and risky innovative ventures more than ever.
*

*

*

77 NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?&sortname= market
cap&sorttype=1 (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
78 Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Dec. 31, 2017); Amazon.com, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 18 (Dec. 31, 2017); Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 (Sept. 30,
2017); Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Dec. 31, 2017) ($16 billion); Microsoft
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (June 30, 2017).
79 This ratio is calculated by dividing the total market capitalization of the five companies, $3.5
trillion, by the firms’ total earnings of $101 billion. A simple average of the separately calculated
price-to-earnings ratios would yield a higher ratio of seventy, because Amazon’s price to earnings
ratio is unusually high, but is diluted when earnings and price are aggregated.
80 James Mackintosh, Beware a Tectonic Shift in Tech Shares, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2018, at B1.
81 Gregory Zuckerman, Biotech Boom Ushers in $3 Million Analyst, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2018, at A1.
82 Kaplan, supra note 75, at 119-20, confirms more rigorously, using data from Jay R. Ritter, IPO
Data, WARRINGTON COLLEGE OF BUS. https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [https://perma.cc/
8FQN-CT7N], that the IPO’s overall now happen at an earlier stage in a company’s profitability.

100

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 71

Two of the big five’s founding shareholders have extra votes83 that lock in
their control (of Google and Facebook). Similarly, some firms go public with
this control structure in place. Thus the insiders could resist stock market
pressure if a low stock price (due to the firms being long-term-oriented)
pressed them to drop long-term projects. But the firms’ stock price is high,
not low; these two companies (and the three without insider voting bonuses)
are well supported by the stock market, not scorned.84
*
*
*
More prosaically, oil companies invest in oil fields that will produce for
multiple decades.85 These firms are mostly public firms with scattered, trading
stockholders. At the same time, the bond market has historically had little problem
making long-term financing commitments to much of the American economy.86
The point here is not that financial markets are perfect, or even good. Surely
some firms are afflicted by short-termism. Plenty of evidence points to financial
markets’ other defects: persistent financial irrationality,87 prices deviating from
fundamental value for long periods,88 major arbitrage failures with similar
investments trading at different values for long periods,89 and a financial sector
plagued intermittently by massive frauds. Financial markets are plausibly too large
and seen in new work to be the means for cartel-like price coordination.90 The
biotech and dot-com bubbles tell us that the stock market can grossly overvalue
the long term. These are all problems, but they are not short-term problems.
Overall, this does not seem like a stock market unable to support long
term–oriented firms.

83 See Dual Class Companies List, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVEST., https://www.cii.org/
files/JuneBoard%20Accountability/Dual%20Class%20Company%20List%202018@20Dual%20Class
20List%20Upgrade.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MGH-KJ5Y].
84 Dual class firms accounted for less than one-sixth of the R&D spending of the largest American
R&D spenders. See Unpublished Appendix Table 1. Moreover, firms with lopsided insider votes do not
do more R&D overall than firms with single class, one-share, one-vote structures. See Onur Arugaslan,
Douglas O. Cook & Robert Kieschnick, On the Decision To Go Public with Dual Class Stock, 16 J. CORP.
FIN. 170, 171 (2010). The voting structures do, however, lock in the controllers’ control of the company.
85 BRIAN HICKS & CHRIS NELDER, PROFIT FROM THE PEAK: THE END OF OIL AND THE
GREATEST INVESTMENT EVENT OF THE CENTURY 23 (2008).
86 See Cláudia Custódio, Miguel A. Ferreira & Luís Laureano, Why Are US Firms Using More
Short-term Debt?, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 182, 211 (2013).
87 See John MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 156-58 (1936) (offering up the beauty contest analogy). Keynes’s evidence is as much
assertion as discovery, but it is widely accepted.
88 See Malcolm Baker, Robin Greenwood & Jeffrey Wurgler, Catering Through Nominal Share
Prices, 64 J. FIN. 2559, 2587 (2009).
89 See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Predatory Trading, 60 J. FIN. 1825, 1827-28
(2005); Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, The Law of One Price in Financial Markets, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 191-200 (2003); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 37-38 (1997).
90 See infra note 106.
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III. WHY ECONOMY-WIDE RESULTS CONTRADICT SHORT-TERM
THEORY
Why is the gap between economy-wide evidence and the wide belief in
stock-market–driven short-termism so large?
First, even if firm-by-firm evidence showing short-term degradation is
correct, other channels, like private equity or venture capital, sometimes do
the job better. Or, second, an American R&D or a capital expenditures
problem, if there is one, could emanate from another cause. Third, perhaps
the stock market is not so short-term after all.
The fourth, final explanation is the most troubling. Maybe short-term
rhetoric captures another underlying concept, namely the perception that
financial markets and Wall Street are degrading too many people’s well-being.
For many employees and their political representatives, employment has
become riskier while Wall Street does well. Too many people feel
economically vulnerable. Short-termist rhetoric could channel angst that the
economic world seems less stable and less fair.
Technological and competitive pressure disrupts lives more thoroughly
than ever. The speed of change disorients, inducing a backlash and
disappointment with the large corporation, a frustration that is misconceived
of as stock-market–driven short-termism. I illustrate this tension by
contrasting the thinking on economic change of two classic twentieth-century
thinkers, Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi.
A. Even If Pernicious Stock Market Short-Termism Is Prevalent
1. Closely held firms and private equity. Innovation is often best done outside
of public firms. Even if securities markets shortened public firms’ time
horizons, alternatives to stock markets are available: venture capital markets
and private equity markets; privately held firms; government financing of
long-term research. Short-termism could be a problem for one public firm or
another, but not for the economy overall.
True, venture capital and private equity may still may not be long-term enough
or big enough or always capable enough. And privately owned firms weaken as their
founders age. Costs afflict repositioning R&D from public firms to Silicon Valley.
Governments do much important R&D work, but governments make mistakes.
Yet these institutions, even if imperfect substitutes, can be big offsets.
And moving R&D from large public firms to smaller, specialized firms is
often a strength, not a second best. For some tasks, the public firm is too slow;
in the pharmaceutical industry, smaller firms are thought more adept at the
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new “large molecule,” biologic pharmaceutical research.91 This shift would
show up as declining R&D in big pharma, but not declining pharma research
overall. “Larger firms are at a comparative disadvantage in conducting
innovative research, because of the costs associated with managing a
heterogeneous set of tasks.”92 And other public firm R&D spending persists
but is not accounted for well: In some industries small firms do the new
research forays. Public companies then buy (often with stock) the small firm
or its research, and then develop, manufacture, and market it. Public firms
and the stock market thereby pay, after the fact, for the R&D.
Private equity corrects some short-termism, to an uncertain degree. Posit
a company that the quarterly oriented stock market makes too short term.
Private equity holders, with much longer time horizons, could buy the
company, take it off the public market, and reorient its business model toward
the longer term. The private equity sector is large, with funds to invest
approximating ten percent of the size of the public stock market.93
Firms that private equity takes private have increased patenting efforts in
the target firm’s core areas of strength.94 Higher inside block ownership is
also associated with more long-term investment.95 Hedge fund ownership
“promotes greater innovative activities and . . . better quality and higher
impact innovation” than are found in firms lacking hedge fund ownership.96
2. Stock market correctives. If public firms err toward the short-term,
investor funds could profit by placing longer-term bets and by developing
credible means for holding on to profitable long-term ventures.
For example, if small holders find it not to be worthwhile to evaluate longterm, complex information, then the market has incentives to produce
mechanisms and intermediaries that facilitate larger block holdings for longer

91 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 439-40 (2009); Walter W. Powell,
Kenneth W. Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116, 122-24 (1996); Weijan Shan,
Gordon Walker & Bruce Kogut, Interfirm Cooperation and Startup Innovation in the Biotechnology
Industry, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 387, 387-88 (1994) .
92 Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305, 305 (1989).
93 John C. Coates IV, Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 79, 90 (Jennifer G. Hill &
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
94 See Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen & Per Strömberg, Private Equity and Long-Run Investment:
The Case of Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 445, 447 (2011) (“We find some evidence that patent portfolios
become more focused in the years after private equity investments.”).
95 See, e.g., Jennifer Francis & Abbie Smith, Agency Costs and Innovation: Some Empirical Evidence, 19
J. ACCT. & ECON. 383, 406 (1995) (associating insider block ownership with greater innovation); James
M. Mahoney, Chamu Sundaramurthy & Joseph T. Mahoney, The Effects of Corporate Antitakeover Provisions
on Long-Term Investment: Empirical Evidence, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 349, 350 (1997).
96 Ying Wang & Jing Zhao, Hedge Funds and Corporate Innovation, 44 FIN. MGMT. 353, 363 (2015).
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time periods. Persistent rules and politics stymieing such efforts historically
are plausible for the United States, which historically cut finance down and
kept blockholders small and ineffective; these could be reconsidered.97 But
market incentives to counterbalance are there, even if imperfect.
3. Stock market organizational correctives. Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon
have put forward the idea that the (purportedly short-term) hedge fund
activists need more votes than they wield directly, to push boards and
executives to change strategies.98 The activists’ need for votes tempers potential
short-term tendencies99 because the votes they need are in mutual funds and
pension funds that hold their stock for the long term, like the growing index
funds. These investors do not trade and would not support activist initiatives
that would damage their stock, which they hold for the long run.
4. Short-termism theory’s predicates. Perhaps the predicates to stock-market–driven
short-termism are weaker than they are usually thought to be. Both trading and
activist engagements have sharply increased over the past two decades, as Figures 1
and 2 illustrate. I accepted these as true because the initial data was supportive.
The big increase in trading in recent years comes from program traders,
who use computer algorithms to trade much stock, often for only a few
seconds. Meanwhile, America’s core shareholders—mutual funds like Fidelity
and Vanguard—have lengthened the duration of their stock holdings.100
Program traders, however, are inert in corporate governance—they do not
militate for short-term or any other corporate decisions. And the growing
index funds that trade infrequently now own much more stock.
Moreover, much of the measured increase in trading during the past halfcentury came in the decade after 1975. Return to Figure 1: stockholding
duration shortened sharply from 1975 to 1987 and then flattened. In 1975, the
stock exchanges’ high fixed commissions ended; trading costs declined
dramatically and trading rose. Trading and holding duration, apart from the
97 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 3-8 (1994); cf. Marcello Puca & Massimiliano Vatiero,
Ownership and Innovation: Evidence from Switzerland 3 (Sept. 26, 2017) (working paper), available
at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2739880 [https://perma.cc/7VPA-2QST] (noting that concentrating
ownership encourages innovation in Swiss firms).
98 See Ronald Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 866-67 (2013).
99 Id. at 897-99.
100 See Jarrad Harford, Ambrus Kecskés & Sattar Mansi, Do Long-Term Investors Improve
Corporate Decision Making? 50 J. CORP. FIN. 424, 428 (2018) (indicating that the volume of long-term
investors has been steady over time); Roe, supra note 36, at 1000 (“Fidelity and Vanguard . . . have
holding durations that have not budged since 1985.”); Anne M. Tucker, The Long and the Short:
Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581, 583, 613 (2018);
Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers
Lifetime Tenure? 28-36 available at ssrn.com/abstract=3107225 [https://perma.cc/KM2M-KFY6]
(analyzing how high-frequency traders push up aggregate trading data).
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program traders, has not dramatically changed in decades, making trading’s
impact on corporate time horizons questionable.
Activism as increasing could also be questioned. Prior to the rise of the
activists, hostile takeovers were common. The takeover was a stock market
pressure on public firm management similar to that which activists exert.101
Hence, we could be seeing little impact from an increase in American
stock-market–driven short-termism, because basic trading and activism have
shifted form, but not intensity or frequency. If roughly unchanged, the
purported rise in stock market short-termism is weak—or is for the future.
5. Hidden in the economy-wide data. R&D is rising, but perhaps it should
be rising even more, with stock market short-termism holding it back. And
while buyouts, net of borrowings, are not draining the public firm sector of
much cash, if there were no buyouts, perhaps cash from the borrowings would
persist and firms, with even more cash than now, would spend more and spend
wisely. Finally, although capital spending is declining all around the
developed world and declined sharply in the United States during the 2007–
2009 financial crisis, perhaps if the United States had no stock market shorttermism, our decline would be less.
All these are logically possible. I leave it to the reader to assess whether
they are likely and whether policymakers should act unless and until good
evidence is brought forward that the aggregates do hide a true, major, and
pernicious outcome. I have not seen this evidence.
B. With Pernicious Stock Market Short-Termism Not Prevalent: Apple and
Occam’s Razor
1. Short-termism’s theoretical underpinnings. The disconnect could be due to
weakness in stock market short-termism’s underpinnings. Briefly, the thinking is
that executives whose compensation is tightly tied to stock price seek to keep their
current stock price high at the expense of longer-term stock price. Relatedly,
executives fear their jobs will be threatened if stock price weakens in the short term.
Lastly (and in my view most plausibly in principle), asymmetric information could
induce executives to favor the short run: if shareholders, particularly smaller
ephemeral shareholders, cannot process long-term information well, and rely on
simple-to-understand quarterly results, then stock price will be weighted to this
short-term information. Executives will manage accordingly.102 Whether this
channel is strong or weak is an empirical question; the fact that the impact of
economy-wide short-termism is difficult to detect suggests that asymmetric
information has only a modest economy-wide impact.
101
102

See generally Jensen, supra note 47, at 327.
Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988).
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2. Occam’s Razor. I have until now in this article not formally picked sides
in the debate as to whether activists induce more short-termism or more
efficiency,103 whether the quarterly focus is not as excessive as it’s sometimes
thought,104 and whether rapid trading is a deep problem or just a sideshow.105
I have instead pushed forward the thesis that the evidence seems more
consistent with any negative effect being minor at the economy-wide level, or
at least not yet shown to be major.
But the existing economy-wide data points to a winner in these disputes.
It fits well with the activists not inducing widespread and inefficient shorttermism,106 with a quarterly focus not being particularly damaging, and with
program traders as being a sideshow. The view that Part I’s “Type A” shorttermism, which shortchanges long-term shareholders for the profit of shortterm shareholders, is strong would be false.
3. Product market competition. Product markets are more concentrated in
the United States than before.107 Weak competition could produce weak
investment in long-lived assets and, with profit high in recent years, low
investment in long-lived assets has weak competition as a plausible cause,
more plausible it seems than stock-market–driven short-termism. (A
monopolist or oligopolist contrives scarcity, to raise prices.) Such a weakening
of R&D and capital expenditures from weakened competition is regrettable
but is not due to trading or horizon-shortening activism. Short-term theory
looks to change stock trading frequency and reduce activism; but, if industrial
103 Compare Bebchuk, supra note 39, and Swanson & Young, supra note 39, with Cremers et al., supra
note 40, and Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Bite the Apple; Poison
the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy (Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com
/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.22303.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBT6-TFR9].
104 Contra Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011.
105 See Roe, supra note 36, at 998-1001 (discussing how program traders inflate turnover and
showing that the duration of investment of core American shareholders, like Fidelity and Vanguard,
has stayed steady in recent decades).
106 See Harford, Kecskés & Mansi, supra note 100, at 448 (concluding that long-term investors,
not short-term investors, induce firms to invest less and pay out more, thus reducing corporate waste
and generating less but better R&D spending results); Zhongzhi He, Jiaping Qiu & Tingfeng Tang,
Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation 31 (2014) (working paper), available at
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2411739 [https://perma.cc/PE75-YDSV] (finding improved R&D output
with hedge fund activism).
107 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1268-69 (2016);
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More
Concentrated? 1 (2017) (working paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2612047 [https://perma
.cc/5Gt5-2W3A]; see also Jose Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of
Common Ownership, J. FIN. 1, 6 (2018); Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Investmentless
Growth: An Empirical Investigation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2017, at 89 (2017)
(finding decreased product market competition could induce less investment); Lawrence J. White
& Jasper Yang, What Has Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the U.S. Economy in the 21st
Century 1-2 (Mar. 30, 2017) (NYU Working Paper), www.ssrn.com/abstract=2953984 [https://perma.
cc/CZ28-X4JL].
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concentration is the source of a low investment problem, dampening stock
market trading or giving executives more authority would fix little and could
damage much. Revamping the government’s merger and monopolization
policies would be the right policy initiative. Misattributing the cause to stock
market short-termism will lead to unfit policy solutions.
C. Limits, Partial Results, and Economy-Wide Fundamentals
1. Limits: judges still must decide. This economy-wide approach has limits.
First, it does not give judges a full metric for decisionmaking; it tells them to
be wary of worrying that the stock market is inducing economy-wide shorttermist results, without telling them how to handle local controversies with
short- and long-term implications for a particular company.
Recall the earlier distinction between: (1) hedge funds forced this firm, or
this class of firms, to be too short-term and (2) hedge fund activism is
seriously harming the economy by making it too short-term. Firm-by-firm
inquiries tell us something about proposition (1), but much less about
proposition (2). But judges decide cases involving proposition (1), not (2).
2. Limits: research methodology, partial impact, and the burden of proof. The broad
data could still embed stock market short-termism, as I have stated. Perhaps it
rests beneath the rising total. Perhaps R&D is not rising enough or perhaps it’s
the wrong kind of R&D—too short term and not transformative, long-term
R&D. But this has not been shown. Similarly, perhaps American public firms,
pressured by the stock market, skewed their capital equipment toward shortlived, quick-return machines, although the data suggests otherwise.108
3. Multiple causes. Short-term theorists have a third response: Shorttermism has many causes. Perhaps the stock market is not the most important
cause, they might concede. But it contributes. Something must be done about
it, especially if the other causes are out of reach.
This argument is wrong. The economy-wide data means one cannot even
be confident that stock-market–driven short-termism is a problem.

108 The data on capital spending shows its duration is not shortening. See infra Appendix
Figure 9. I deemphasize this aspect here, because it is not core to the short-term theory and, as far
as I know, no short-term theorist has brought forward the idea or the supporting data. But if the
idea is brought forward, it would have to contend with the initial look at the data, which does not
show capital equipment’s expected life shortening over time.
Stephen Terry extrapolates from earnings management an R&D-induced .1% reduction in annual
economy-wide growth. See Stephen Terry, The Macro Impact of Short-Termism (unpublished manuscript
2015), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/10386 [https://perma.cc/9Q5K-VQTZ]. But, as he indicates,
the firms reducing R&D could be those in need of managerial disciplining. Id. at 32. Also, the paper reaches
its conclusion by assuming that short-term pressures in private firms are the same magnitude as in public
firms, id. at 27, an idea that fits best with short-termism not emanating primarily from the stock market.
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The story is similar with buybacks as draining cash. The public firm in the 1970s
and 1980s hoarded cash, and when it spent the money, it often spent that cash on
nonviable projects, like buying companies that were poor long-run corporate fits,
leading to overly large firms that were later broken up.109 Anti-buyback policies
aiming to reduce short-termism could recreate that unwanted result.
4. Economy-wide fundamentals: mismeasuring assets in a post-industrial
information economy. The world’s wealthiest economies are shifting from hard
asset manufacturing to information-based economies. That shift predicts more
R&D and less spending on manufacturing assets, both of which we see in this
article’s data. In retailing, brick-and-mortar physical stores are disappearing;
instead, online distribution is growing. Information technology’s capacity to
get more out of existing capital contributes to declining capital investment
around the world.110 Intangibles are more important relative to hard assets in
today’s economy than they once were.111 Intangibles were one-tenth of public
firms’ assets in 1970 and 50% of assets by 2010.112 Private firms could well
manage intangibles better than public companies.113
5. More fundamentals: secular stagnation and stalling innovation. Secular
stagnation has been brought forward to explain declining capital investment by
Lawrence Summers.114 Secular stagnation sees macroeconomic characteristics
and cheaper capital equipment leading to high savings but low investment.
109 Jarrad Harford, Mark Humphery-Jenner & Ronan Powell, The Sources of Value Destruction
in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 247, 248 (2012) (“The post-merger
operating performance for acquisitions by entrenched managers is worse than for others. . . .”).
Contra Asli M. Arikan & René M. Stulz, Corporate Acquisitions, Diversification, and the Firm’s Life
Cycle, 71 J. FIN. 139, 140 (2016); Jensen, supra note 47, at 328.
110 See Tim Worstall, Declining Capital Investment No Problem in a Digital Economy,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Nov. 2015), www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Declining-capital-in
vestment-no-problem-in-a-digital-economy [https://perma.cc/V2V3-JTH3] (explaining that the
capital to set up an internet company “can be hired for peanuts”).
111 See JONATHAN HASKEL & STIAN WESTLAKE, CAPITALISM WITHOUT CAPITAL: THE
RISE OF THE INTANGIBLE ECONOMY 7, 24 (2018); Gutiérrez & Philippon, supra note 107; Robin
Döttling & Enrico C. Perotti, Secular Trends and Technological Progress 1 (June 2017) (working
paper), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2996998 [https://perma.cc/TTX7-8F7M].
112 See Antonio Falato, Dalida Kadyrzhanova & Jae W. Sim, Rising Intangible Capital, Shrinking Debt
Capacity, and the US Corporate Savings Glut 8, 41 (Fed. Res. Bd. Working Paper No. 67, 2013),
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201367/201367pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK5R-LT26].
113 Craig Doidge, Kathleen M. Kahle, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Eclipse of the Public
Corporation or Eclipse of the Public Markets?, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3100255 [https://perma.
cc/97RC-5WCR]. Industrial manufacturing became less important in the S&P 500 over the decades, while
services and technology have become more so. To see whether changed composition is the primary
explanation for the decline in capital expenditures and rise in R&D, the measures were redone, with initial
sector weighting held constant; then the two were rescaled with the final sector division used. The trend—
R&D up, capital expenditures down—persisted; the slope changed.
114 Lawrence H. Summers, The Age of Secular Stagnation: What It Is and What to Do About It,
FOREIGN AFF. Mar.–Apr. 2016, (seeing secular stagnation and declining investment as “an
imbalance resulting from an increasing propensity to save and a decreasing propensity to invest”).

108

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 71

Robert Gordon reaches the same conclusion via a different channel: no new
productivity technologies were strong enough in recent decades to generate a
burst in capital spending.115 Good technological ideas are getting harder and
more expensive to find.116 (I do not here say that these assuredly explain rising
R&D and declining capital investment around the world; rather, they explain
these trends better than does stock market short-termism.)
If a more basic economic imperative compels less capital equipment—an IT
economy, more efficient use of equipment in place, lower cost capital goods, a lack
of game-changing innovations, or secular stagnation—then activist investors could
be aligning public firms with the underlying economic phenomenon and not be
causing the change. Focusing on stock market short-termism could again have us
pursuing an economically damaging remedy when the real problem lies elsewhere.
D. Political and Social Reasons Why, Regardless of Prevalence:
Schumpeter v. Polanyi
Technological change and competitive pressures are sharper and deeper
in the twenty-first century than ever before. What critics see as short-termism
could be the consequence of disruptive technologies now coming every five
years instead of every five decades, of government policy changes being
deeper than ever, and of global markets now continually disrupting firms.117
This view can be expanded. What if productivity and technological
upheavals demand that more economic decisions should be made for the shortrun? What if technological change is so quick that many business sectors
should not invest for multi-decade returns? Flexibility and adaptability may
be more important than ever before. If so, the economy may pressure
corporate executives more strongly to adapt than ever.
The body of this Article has examined whether stock-market–driven shorttermism has been misanalyzed economically, because economy-wide
consequences are hard to find. Stopping there would miss a more severe and
more difficult-to-handle problem: what if this conclusion were irrelevant to the
backlash against disruption and disorientation but arises from the political conditions
of our time? Accelerating change, technological and otherwise, probably makes it
more efficient than ever for more investments and decisions to be nimble,
115 See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 2, 566-68, 57476 (2016) (seeing a paucity of game-changing productivity-improving innovation in recent decades).
116 Nicholas Bloom, Charles I. Jones, John Van Reenen & Michael Webb, Are Ideas Getting
Harder to Find? 46 (Mar. 5, 2018) (working paper), available at https://web.stanford.
edu/~chadj/IdeaPF.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6HS-GC4M] (“Our robust finding is that research
productivity is falling sharply everywhere we look”). This explanation fits awkwardly with the
technological acceleration explanation.
117 For globalization and corporate governance, see generally Jonathan Macey, Their Bark is
Bigger Than Their Bite: An Essay on Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite, 126 YALE L.J. F. 526 (2017).
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adaptable, and not set in concrete. This renders employees’ economic security
riskier. This uncertainty disrupts the workplace, ruins employees’ careers, and
then spills into the polity, with “short-termism” becoming a part of the rhetoric
against change. If firms adapt rapidly and people are hurt and recurringly
disoriented, those damaged and those representing them in the polity will react.
They may not particularly care whether the disruptive change is efficient overall.
They dislike it regardless and call it “short-termism.”118
“Short-termism” in political rhetoric119 then may be driven primarily by the
view of ordinary people, and their political avatars, that Wall Street and stock
markets are enriching the few and disrupting the many. With castigating stock
market “short-termism” rhetorically legitimated by respected businesspeople,120 the
phrase became a politically acceptable way to attack twenty-first century capitalist
disruption. Lawmakers who excoriate stock market short-termism typically see
vulnerable employees and stakeholders as victims of a Wall Street casino. Vice
President Joe Biden’s earlier-cited disquisition on stock market short-termism,
published shortly after he had considered a presidential run, concluded that “most
of the harm is borne by workers.”121 Senators lamenting investor short-termism see
it as costing factory workers their jobs.122 Policy think tanks that worry about shorttermism quickly turn to the concomitant harm to employees and other corporate
stakeholders.123 They are not concerned with the damage a myopic stock market
does to stockholders, but the impact on employees and corporate stakeholders.
Disruption generates backlash.
1. The accelerating velocity of technological change and corporate turnover.
Consider Figure 10 and the time needed for technologies like the telephone,
the radio, the personal computer, the cell phone, and Internet access to
spread: nearly three-quarters of a century for the telephone to reach half of

118 In this view, Part I’s Type A short-termism is false: long-term stockholders profit from rapid
adaptation. But Type B short-termism is here the core disruptive issue: the rapid change alters too
many employees’ work lives for the worse to be left politically uncontested.
119 See sources cited supra notes 19–24 (describing views on short-termism taken by prominent
political figures).
120 See Lipton, supra note 42 (arguing that short-termism’s harms are significant); see also
Dimon & Buffett, supra note 16 (same).
121 Biden, supra note 19.
122 Senators Baldwin & Merkley, supra note 21 (“We cannot allow our economy to be hijacked by a small
group of investors who seek only to enrich themselves at the expense of workers, communities, and taxpayers.”).
123 MIKE KONCZAL, J.W. MASON & AMANDA PAGE-HOONGRAJOK, ENDING SHORT-TERMISM:
AN INVESTMENT AGENDA FOR GROWTH 16-18 (Nov. 6, 2015), www.rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Ending-Short-Termism.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5XJ-G7MH] (arguing that adding worker
directors could combat short-termism); THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY CORP. GOVERNANCE GRP.,
PROMOTING LONG-TERM WEALTH: RESHAPING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2017), https://tomorr
owscompany.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Promoting-long-term-wealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XZXUUNN] (arguing that stakeholder voice protects shareholders from short-termism).
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the population; a quarter of a century for the next mass technology, the radio;
and nearly 20 years for the personal computer. A decade for the internet.
The number of patents has tripled in the past twenty-five years, as Figure
9 showed. And 94% of the responding Fortune 500 CEOs agreed with the
statement: “My company will change more in the next five years than it has
in the last five years,” with 72% seeing the rapid pace of technological
innovation as among the handful of the company’s biggest challenges.124

Years before reaching one-half
of American population

Figure 10: The Accelerating Rate of Diffusion of New Technologies125
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The same phenomenon, seen analogously: “In the nineteen-twenties, an
engineer’s ‘half-life of knowledge’—the time it took for half of his expertise
to become obsolete—was thirty-five years. In the 1960s, it was a decade. Now
it’s five years at most and, for a software engineer, less than three.”126
Corporate turnover is accelerating as well. The number of new firms rose
until 2006, took a break during the financial crisis, and then started rising
again, reaching its historical high by 2015.127 The average duration of a firm

124 2015 Fortune 500 CEO Survey, FORTUNE (June 4, 2015), www.fortune.com/2015/06/04
/fortune-500-ceo-survey/ [https://perma.cc/8Z2Q-UR3V].
125 ADAM THIERER & GRANT ESKELSEN, MEDIA METRICS: THE TRUE STATE OF THE
MODERN MEDIA MARKETPLACE 18 (PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., 2008); Michael J.
Mauboussin & Dam Callahan, A Long Look at Short-Termism: Questioning the Premise, 27 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 70, 72 (2015).
126 Tad Friend, Getting On, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 2017, at 46.
127 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE U.S. ECONOMY, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (2016),
https://www.bls.gov/bdm/entrepreneurship/entrepreneurship.htm [https://perma.cc/BHZ3-JH8W].
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in Standard & Poor’s list of the 500 largest firms is shortening.128 “[P]ublic
companies are perishing sooner than ever before.”129 In 1970, the average life
span of all corporations listed on stock exchanges was about a half-century,
while by 2010 the life span had halved.130 “[B]usinesses move [through] their
life cycles twice as quickly as they did 30 years ago.”131
2. Creative destruction. Creative destruction is, in Joseph Schumpeter’s
classic formulation, the crux of market capitalism:
Capitalism . . . never can be stationary. . . . The fundamental impulse that
sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’
goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the
new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.
. . . The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the
organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as
U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation—if I may use that
biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.132

The United States, more than any other major economy, has let the forces
of creation and destruction operate in the economy. But there comes a rate of
destruction that is too fast and too severe for the body politic to absorb.
3. Employment uncertainty. The average person is insecure about his or her
job and career. Many skills have an ever-shortening half-life.
Phenomena that disrupt people’s jobs will not always be taken in stride. Some
want to block or slow down that change, criticizing it as short term. Technology is
predicted to make employment even more insecure in the United States, with
automation displacing nearly forty million workers and prompting fifteen million
to change occupations—disrupting about a quarter of the workforce.133

128 Creative Destruction Whips through Corporate America, INNOSIGHT (Feb. 2012),
https://www.innosight.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/creative-destruction-whips-through-corpor
ate-america_final2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYK3-LSJP].
129 Martin Reeves & Lisanne Pueschel, Die Another Day: What Leaders Can Do About the
Shrinking Life Expectancy of Corporations, BCG PERSP. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://img-stg.bcg.com/BCGDie-Another-Day-Dec-2015_tcm9-76807.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6YU-U5RY].
130 Id. at 3, ex. 1 (juxtaposing the increasing lifespan of humans against the decreasing lifespan
of public companies).
131 Id. at 2.
132 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82-83 (Routledge
Classics 1994) (1942) (footnote omitted).
133 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED: WORKFORCE TRANSITIONS IN A
TIME OF AUTOMATION 102-03 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured
%20Insights/Future%20of%20Organizations/What%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mea
n%20for%20jobs%20skills%20and%20wages/MGI-Jobs-Lost-Jobs-Gained-Report-December-6-2017
.ashx [https://perma.cc/2P7C-UGU2].
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4. Material interests. Important players have an economic interest in
policymakers accepting short-term theory. Executives and boards of directors
gain from short-term theory as an analytic lever to reduce the power of activists
and shareholders. Employees whose jobs would be disrupted by change also have
an interest in slowing down corporate change. Repetition of a plausible theory
that fits one’s interests can engender deep belief in that theory.
5. Public opinion. Public opinion separately explains short-termism’s pull.
Attacking short-termism appeals to the average citizen’s aversion to Wall
Street.134 Across the polity, 58% of America thinks that Wall Street harms the
economy more than it helps it.135 A loose coalition unites under the banner of
short-termism, with its constituents’ underlying goals differing: for
executives, the question is who should have authority in the firm, shareholders
or executives; for the broader polity, the question is whether businesses and
Wall Street are helping or hurting the average person.
The American populace has long distrusted Wall Street and finance, often
manifesting this by keeping finance broken up and reducing its power to act
on industry.136 The short-term debate is partly its latest manifestation.
6. Polanyi’s popular revolt against the market. This tension is not new and is
fundamental to capitalism. Since Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation, a thick strand
of analysis has been on how markets are politically-constructed and can destabilize
the polity, because markets and the polity must fit. If too much of a democratic
polity dislikes the results that markets bring—uncertainty, job shifts, job losses—
then the market’s sharp edges must be rounded off for political stability, usually
via social stabilizers, like social security and workplace rules.137 The political
rhetoric of short-termism subsumes much of this sensibility.
Not economic exploitation, as often assumed, but the disintegration of the
cultural environment of the victim is then the cause of the degradation. The
economic process may, naturally, supply the vehicle of the destruction, and
almost invariably economic inferiority will make the weaker yield, but the
immediate cause of his undoing is not for that reason economic; it lies in the
lethal injury to the institutions in which his social existence is embodied. The
134 Philip Bump, Shock Poll: Everyone Hates Wall Street, WASH. POST, June 30, 2016; cf. Jim Lardner,
Americans Agree on Regulating Wall Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.usnews.
com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/09/16/poll-shows-americans-want-more-wall-street-regulationfive-years-after-the-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/6HM5-6W5N] (finding that “[r]egulating financial
services and products is seen as either ‘important’ or ‘very important’ by more than 90 percent of voters . . . .”);
Eric Orts, A Stock Market for the Rich, LINKEDIN (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/stock-marketrich-eric-orts/) [https://perma.cc/3EGY-WX3T] (arguing that “the stock market has become a vehicle too
much composed and tilted toward the interests of the very rich”).
135 Id.
136 ROE, supra note 97.
137 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 75-80, 136-39, 151-55, 185-86, 210-12, 260 (1944).
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result is loss of self-respect and standards, whether the unit is a people or a
class, whether the process springs from so-called culture conflict or from a
change in the position of a class within the confines of a society.138

Or, summarized: “Polanyi got . . . the big picture right. Democracy
cannot survive an excessively free market . . . .”139 Polanyi’s process maps onto
this view of short-termism as a reaction to disorienting change as much as an
analysis of stock market economics of the time-efficiency of investments.140
*
*
*
One explanation for the disconnect between hard evidence and wide
belief is that repetition from self-interested corporate elites seeds discourse
in the media and in politics, so that the view is taken as probably true.
Examples are vivid and to many prove the point. Second is a popular animus
against Wall Street, which is doing the trading—and a sense that a powerful
Wall Street is not benefiting the average person or the economy. And the
third possibility is the self-interest of those who would be displaced and fear
change. Combine the three and we see an idea whose time has come.
CONCLUSION
The short-termism inquiry has become a vital part of corporate law and
governance in the past decade, engaging academics, judges, and lawyers; it is
one of the few corporate law issues that spills over into national politics and the
nonbusiness media. Most media and political commentary see corporate shorttermism as widespread, debilitating affected firms, and pernicious for the
economy overall, as corporate America cuts R&D, cripples itself by wasting
cash in excessive stock buybacks, eats away at its own foundations by failing to
invest in new capital and equipment, and fails to support future-oriented firms.
Academic analyses are more mixed, but to a distant reader will seem
inconclusive: a study showing that activists do not destroy long-term value is
countered by one showing the contrary; a study showing that institutional
investors do not undermine R&D is rejected by one saying the opposite.
Hence, we turned here, and I believe this is the first effort to do so
systematically, to see whether the pernicious economy-wide outcomes that
short-term theory posits are afflicting the American economy can be found.
They cannot be found in the data. Capital expenditure is down since the
2008–2009 recession, but it is also down around the developed world. And it
Id. at 164-65.
Robert Kuttner, The Man from Red Vienna, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 21, 2017, at 55, 57 (book review).
Cf. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 116-41
(2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1972-74 (1991);
Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217-19 (1998).
138
139
140
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is down for nations that use stock markets as a major source of corporate
financing and for those that do not. Moreover, American factory utilization is
in 2018 still low compared to historic norms: the decade after the 2008–2009
U.S. recession has not been propitious for strong capital investment. Stock
buybacks are up, but so is corporate borrowing, with the cash inflow and
outflow roughly netting out; historically low interest rates explain why large
firms have been substituting borrowings for stock. Research and development
is not declining in the American economy. Nor is it declining in the 500 largest
nonfinancial firms over the last several decades when shareholder activism rose
to prominence and rapid trading accelerated. Maybe there should be more
R&D, but that has not been shown. The largest American firms by stock
market capitalization are tech-based, innovation-oriented companies.
Thus the big four consequences of stock market short-termism brought
forward previously are either contradicted (buybacks draining cash, stock
markets shunning long-term firms), better explained otherwise (declining
capital expenditures), or without supporting economy-wide data (R&D).
Those promoting the short-term theory seek major policy changes because,
they assert, stock market short-termism is harming the overall economy. These
policy changes could be costly, could harm other economic channels, and, even
if there is a capital spending, R&D, or cash problem, focusing on a falsely
accused stock market, if stock markets are not the source of any underlying
problems, could leave the real culprits to roam the economy, doing damage.141
Declining competition, for example, is an alternate explanation. But the
economy-wide approach does tell us that the proponents of stock-market–
driven short-termism have not yet made their case that stock-market–driven
short-termism is seriously damaging the economy. Burdens of proof are well
known to lawyers. If one recommends policy changes based on a detrimental
economy-wide impact, one should bring forward evidence of its economywide presence, power, and perniciousness. Not only has this not been done,
but the broad evidence points to the contrary.
Worse yet, seeing R&D degradation, buybacks, and capital spending as
assuredly affecting the economy faces serious conceptual difficulties. A local
degradation could be offset elsewhere in the economy and often is. Venture
capital and private equity firms profit by picking up public firm slack (in
R&D); reallocating cash from older to younger sectors is good not bad
(buybacks); and a post-industrial economy has less reason to invest in hard
assets than an industrial economy (capital expenditures). While it is too high a
burden of proof to ask proponents of wide stock-market–driven short-termism
141 Some short-term critics’ recommendations, such as greater board accountability, enhanced
disclosure, and tightening gaps in buyback regulation, are worthy objectives. But they do not need
stock market short-termism for justification. ASPEN INST., supra note 10, at 3.
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to show an impact on GNP, it is not too much to want to see an impact on the
intermediate channels through which stock market short-termism is said to
harm GNP. That has not been forthcoming. The economy-wide look reveals as
good or better a fit with functional capital markets moving cash out from older
firms and into younger ones, and in putting innovation into private
organizations that may well innovate better than large public firms.
Overall, first, the decline in capital expenditure is better explained
otherwise than by stock market short-termism, cash is not draining from
corporate America by buyouts or otherwise, data showing an economy-wide
hit to R&D has not been forthcoming. Second, firm-by-firm data points to
(but is not analyzed here) the likelihood that the stock market is not driving
firms overall to excessive short-termism. And, third, the logic of market
organization points to most stockholders as wanting long-term value; plenty
of players make money by finding long-term valuable investments; a longterm profitable investment produces more value overall than forgoing that
investment. This is tautological but fundamental; hence, there will always be
some pressure to revert to the long-term and some players that favor doing
so, because there is more total money and incentive for long-term investment.
Positional roadblocks disrupt these overall incentives but do not repeal them.
Fourth, the logic of market organization with two industries—venture capital
and private equity—often doing the job better than public firms limits
economy-wide costs from stock market short-termism; some firms lose, but
oftentimes not the economy overall. And, fifth, the success of long-term,
technologically oriented companies like America’s big five—Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft—tell us that short-termism cannot be
corrosively destructive everywhere in the American stock market.
All told, the stock-market–driven short-termism story is weak.
What explains the discrepancy between (1) the broad, economy-wide data, on
the one hand, and (2) the micro, firm-by-firm mixed message combined with the
widespread belief in short-termism having a pernicious economy-wide impact on
the other hand? A strong possibility is that as long as wide sectors of the economy
can compensate for any stock market short-termism with their own long-termism,
then the economic damage from stock market short-termism, if it exists, is minor.
A simple explanation is that those firm-by-firm micro studies that show shorttermism not to be a problem, and to often be an economic benefit, may be correct,
with the contrary studies less important. Perhaps the short-termist idea is
overblown, pushed rhetorically by corporate executives and their representatives
as justifying according executives and boards yet more autonomy from
shareholders. Executives have self-interested reasons to push the short-termism
story, as it justifies more executive autonomy and less power for shareholders.
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Short-termism theory also serves executives in deflecting blame. The polity
distrusts large corporations, seeing them as not run for the average person and as
a means to perpetuate a wealthy elite, while often stifling employees, customers,
and society overall. The short-termist argument allows executives to deflect those
charges and point a finger at Wall Street: “We’re not the problem,” they can say.
“It’s the short-term traders and the activist shareholders that prevent us from
being the good guys we’d really otherwise be. Our hands are tied.”
Another but subtle self-interested channel is in play. The ideology of shorttermism gives believing executives a coherent world view. They are not being
selfish when seeking power to elide shareholders and diminish shareholder
authority inside the corporation; they are doing the right thing for the economy
and society. It is not self-aggrandizement. Ideological coherence—the
banishment of self-doubt—provides its own source of managerial power.
A more insidious and destabilizing version of this political thesis has not yet
been vividly raised. Stock markets could have become efficiently more short-term
because product cycles are shortening, technology is changing more rapidly than
ever, and the impact of that technological change is wider, deeper, and more
disruptive than before. These market forces are channeled into and through the
corporation, which cannot or at least does not provide security for its
constituents. But even if this efficiency dynamic is true—and to be transparent,
I believe it to be largely true—understanding that truth will not end the
problem: whether it’s efficient or not, people whose working lives, personal lives,
and sense of self are disrupted by workplace change and made vulnerable will
react. They often blame markets, financial and otherwise. This short-termist
criticism is thus in this sense accurate: markets caused the disruption, irrespective
of whether markets were efficiently or inefficiently short term. Fear of shorttermism is a tool to attack the shareholder-oriented, profits-based goals of the
large corporation. Those affected react politically and can conveniently, even if
inaccurately, call the problem stock market “short-termism.”
But this possibility would mean that the truth or falsity of the stock
market short-termist idea is politically and socially unimportant. Even if
change brings about economic progress overall, that overall progress fails to
comfort those who lose from the transformed economy. We thus have more
than a simple interpretive problem at hand—does the evidence support shorttermism as perniciously coming from excessive stock market trading?—but
serious conflict. And it may well be serious conflict that will not abate.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Figure 1: R&D Expenditures in the Non-Financial S&P 500,
1975–2016142
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Appendix Figure 2: R&D in the Non-Financial S&P 500, Scaled by GDP,
1975–2016143
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S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE, supra note 53.
For R&D, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE, see supra note 53; for GDP, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMM., see supra note 71.
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Appendix Figure 3: R&D in Nonfinancial S&P 500,
Scaled by Corporate Earnings (EBITDA)144
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Appendix Figure 4: Non-S&P 500 Buybacks and Borrowings145
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In this graphic, the solid line shows the net stock buybacks in nonfinancial public corporations
outside the S&P 500. Buybacks here are generally negative, meaning that outside of the S&P 500
companies are, overall, raising money in the stock market (unlike S&P 500 companies). Non-S&P
500 companies are raising yet more cash by borrowing.
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Appendix Figure 5: Net Cash Inflow to S&P 500 and Non-S&P 500, Net
Borrowings Minus Net Buybacks, 2002–2016146
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In this graphic, I combine net buybacks and borrowings for the nonfinancial S&P 500 and outside
the S&P 500. Gross buybacks in the S&P 500 since 2002 average one-quarter trillion dollars
annually, illustrated in Figure 5. But when netting borrowings against buybacks, the net cash outflow
drops 60%, to $100 billion annually, seen above in the solid red line. The non-S&P 500 cash inflow
further offsets this, as seen in the dashed blue line, with their total inflow exceeding the S&P 500
outflow, as seen in the dotted black line. This result suggests an outflow from large, mature S&P
500 firms and an inflow to smaller firms.

Appendix Figure 6: S&P 500 Cash-on-hand as Portion of GDP, 1971–2016147
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That is, in 2016, the S&P 500 collectively held nearly $100 of cash for each $1000 of GDP. In 2009,
the S&P 500 held about $50 of cash for each $1000 of GDP; in 1980, they held about $25.
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Appendix Figure 7: S&P 500 Cash as a Portion of Earnings, 1971–2016148
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Appendix Figure 8: Capital Expenditure, Scaled to Corporate Cash Flow,
S&P 500, 1988–2016149
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Appendix Figure 9. Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, Without
Intellectual Property and After Depreciation, 1970–2016150
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This figure accounts for the Department of Commerce adding films to intellectual property investment
and then adding IP to capital expenditures, boosting the total. See supra note 71. The two lower lines
subtract out all IP expenditures, including film. The resulting trend still resembles the gross capital
expenditure trend, in the top line of this graphic and Figure 3. Further, gross capital expenditure does not
capture whether short-lived or long-lived assets are being purchased. But deducting capital that wears out
(depreciation), as in the lower dashed line, accounts for this. Again, no major change in the shape of the
curve. For all four, the sharpest drop occurs during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Appendix Figure 10: Capital Investment in China and India, 1970–2016151
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